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The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the concept of organizational ambidexterity 
(OA) into the domain of not-for-profit (NFP) organizations. These organizations are subject to 
many of the same demands as their for-profit counterparts, yet research has not been conducted 
on how NFPs manage the competing pressures of refining existing routines for efficiency with 
the need to grow and innovate. This dissertation includes two portions: a quantitative analysis of 
a large NFP-rating agency dataset and qualitative interviews with executive directors and 
managers from within the food banking industry to identify the processes in use at a sample of 
ambidextrous organizations.  
The quantitative study uses a financial outcome—fiscal performance—in order to assess 
the degree to which financial outcomes are affected by exploration and exploitation, two actions 
central to the ambidexterity paradigm. Results of this study indicate that although exploration 
and exploitation are related to fiscal performance within NFPs, the results vary greatly depending 
on the industry in question.  
The qualitative portion of the study indicates that three activities aid NFPs in engaging in 
exploration and exploitation: managing knowledge, retaining professional talent, and enabling 
leadership. This study concludes with implications for researchers and managers, as well as 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Study Rationale 
One of the central premises of strategic management is that through the effective 
execution of strategy, leaders have the ability to alter their organization’s competitive position 
within the larger environment (Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
Dynamic capabilities research (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) 
suggests that organizations must continually acquire and realign resources in new ways in order 
to survive and thrive in increasingly complex environments (De Geus, 2002; Piao, 2010). These 
tenets apply to profit-seeking businesses, such as manufacturers of semiconductors (O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2008), software (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), and consumer products (Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996), as well as other types of organizations, such as hospitals (Rushing, 1974), 
churches (Plowman et al., 2007), and health maintenance organizations (Ginsberg & Buchholtz, 
1990). The development of repeatable, routinized processes (Adler et al., 2009) promotes the 
efficient use of resources, but organizations must also resist the continual threat of becoming too 
entrenched in a particular product, service, or process. This delicate balancing act has proven 
difficult for many organizations to maintain (Adler et al., 2009; Benner & Tushman, 2003). 
Within the domain of strategic management, the concept of organizational ambidexterity (OA) 
(Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009) addresses the inherent tension 
of developing repeatable, efficient routines and practices while also adapting to changing 
conditions.  
OA has been defined in more than twenty ways since its original conceptualization 
(Duncan, 1976) and each definition attempts to capture the essence of an organization that can 
pursue two different goals: exploration and exploitation. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
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Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga’s (2006: 647) parsimonious definition is used to describe 
OA: “Ambidextrous firms are capable of exploiting existing competencies as well as exploring 
new opportunities with equal dexterity.” Although OA has been studied in a number of different 
industries and countries, one context remains unexplored that may inform our understanding of 
how organizations engage in these two types of actions: the not-for-profit sector.  
Not-for-profits (NFPs) are beginning to shoulder a greater burden of the development and 
distribution of social programs that were previously considered to be under the purview of 
governmental agencies (Smith & Lipsky, 1995; Van Slyke, 2007); consequently, NFPs must 
balance the efficient delivery of existing services with changes in the greater environment that 
may influence future demand (Ryan, 1999). These changes can include new or discontinued 
funding opportunities (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009) and shifts in growth potential (Kaplan & 
Grossman, 2010) that complicate the efforts of NFPs to focus solely on existing programs and 
services. Thus, NFPs provide an excellent context in which to explore OA because they are 
constrained by the scope of their mission yet must develop new opportunities to counter overall 
declines in rates of charitable giving.  
Study Purpose 
 Despite recent attention to ambidextrous operations in the strategic management 
literature, including a 2009 special issue in Organization Science, no studies to date have 
attempted to assess the correspondence between ambidextrous operations within the NFP sector 
(See Simsek et al., 2009 for a thorough review) even though this sector comprises more than 1.1 
million organizations, contributes nearly 5% of the United States gross domestic product, and 
employs more than 12.9 million workers (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009). This study expands the 
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boundaries of the ambidexterity hypothesis to test its premises on a sample of NFP organizations 
in order to determine the relationship between OA and organizational performance within this 
unique organizational context. This study also examines a sample of NFP food banks to 
understand the processes that their managers use to engage in high levels of exploration and 
exploitation.  
Given the effects of ambidextrous operations on overall organizational effectiveness, two 
key research questions arise. Specifically:  
RQ1.  What impact does ambidexterity have on financial performance? 
RQ2.  How do ambidextrous organizations engage in exploration and exploitation activities? 
Assumptions 
 One of the key assumptions of NFP research is that best practice methods and measures 
from for-profit business can be applied to not-for-profit organizations (Kaplan, 2001). The direct 
social impact of strategic NFP actions can be nearly impossible to measure reliably (Rojas, 
2000), but organizations that focus on business-related routines such as performance 
measurement, reporting, and stakeholder management are still expected to outperform 
organizations within a similar “industry” (Salamon, Geller, & Mengel, 2010; Siciliano, 1996). 
As NFPs embrace the professionalism of services and management (Hwang & Powell, 2009), 
many may improve their performance through the implementation of strategies initially 
developed to benefit the for-profit sector. However, if NFPs are implementing professional 
practices from the for-profit sector in a haphazard manner (Rojas, 2000), then ambidexterity may 
provide a common vocabulary to describe the competing pressures that NFPs face: the balance of 
long-term growth prospects with the efficient delivery of current programs. The field of strategic 
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management and society as a whole are likely to benefit from a more holistic approach to 
growing societal wealth by including NFPs as a worthwhile source of data and a beneficiary of 
empirical research findings from the strategy literature.  
NFPs make a particularly compelling context for understanding OA due to a number of 
constraints not typically seen in the OA literature. First, NFPs organize around a central mission 
that defines the scope of their programs, products, and services and makes growth through 
unrelated diversification unlikely. Second, many NFPs are local or regional in nature (e.g., 
Virginia Beach SPCA, Knox Area Rescue Ministries), which eliminates geographic expansion as 
a viable growth opportunity. Finally, third-party agencies rate NFPs to identify how each 
organization spends its money. Expenses related to utilities, property, and professional staff are 
considered inefficient as they represent expenditures that do not go directly to program expenses. 
Consequently, NFPs have an incentive to maximize efficiency within a constrained set of growth 
opportunities, resulting in an unlikely setting for ambidextrous behavior. These conditions make 
NFPs an excellent context in which to view OA and to study if and how NFP managers attempt 
to engage in exploration and exploitation.  
Overview of Methodology 
This dissertation uses a mixed methods approach to understand the effects of 
ambidextrous operations on organizational effectiveness and the underlying processes at work in 
a subset of ambidextrous NFPs.  
 First, the quantitative data for this study are IRS-990 financial filings organized by the 
third-party NFP monitoring organization, Charity Navigator (CN). Data span the fiscal years 
ending between January 2008 and December 2009. Based on CN’s ratings of two theoretically-
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relevant dimensions, exploration and exploitation, organizations were clustered into groups. 
Following this categorization, means tests were conducted to determine the fiscal performance 
levels associated with exploration and exploitation. Additionally, robust clustered regression was 
used to determine the relationship between ratings of exploration and exploitation and NFP fiscal 
performance. The sample covers a wide variety of different industries, allowing for further 
analysis of organizations that vary in their levels of capital intensity (orchestras vs. food banks), 
size (national vs. local), and age (old vs. young organizations).  
 Second, the qualitative portion of this dissertation examines a sample of NPFs from the 
food banking industry in order to understand the processes by which organizations 
simultaneously engage in high levels of exploration and exploitation. Through four site visits and 
a series of semi-structured interviews, data were gathered and analyzed for major themes related 
to managing this paradox. These findings are discussed in conjunction with their ability to relate 
to the for-profit strategy literature. 
Contributions 
This study makes a number of contributions to the ambidexterity literature base. First, the 
use of a large-scale dataset provides the statistical power to isolate industry-specific differences 
in OA. Many of the larger samples in extant ambidexterity research have been limited to single-
industry research contexts such as software (Venkatraman et al., 2007), biotechnology 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), or robotics (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Meanwhile, empirical tests of 
ambidexterity that use alternate methodologies such as case studies (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 
1999; Han, 2005; Tarafdar & Gordon, 2007) are necessarily limited to single organizations or 
industries, making comparisons difficult if not impossible. The use of a large-scale, multi-
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industry dataset contributes to the ambidexterity literature by isolating the effects of 
ambidextrous operations on organizational performance while also allowing for comparisons 
across different industries. 
Second, this study contributes to the ongoing debate of whether or not ambidexterity is a 
continuous or orthogonal construct (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Although exploration and 
exploitation were originally considered trade-offs that needed to be balanced lest an organization 
find itself mediocre at both (March, 1991), more recent research has suggested that these two 
concepts are orthogonal rather than continuous (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; 
Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). Consistent with prior studies, the presence of a significant 
interaction term between exploration and exploitation would provide evidence that exploration 
and exploitation are orthogonal and can be pursued simultaneously; however, this interaction has 
not always been significant in prior research (Bierly & Daly, 2007). 
 Third, the use of a mixed-methods research design provides a better understanding of the 
underlying processes at work within ambidextrous organizations. Although a few previous 
studies of ambidexterity have employed a mixed-methods research design (Beckman, 2006; 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004a), this remains the exception rather than the norm. The use of 
qualitative interviews to more thoroughly describe the underlying processes at work within NFPs 
contributes to two different literature streams: ambidexterity and NFPs. By introducing a widely 
studied theoretical perspective from strategic management to the unique context of NFPs, this 
study begins to make connections between two literature streams that could benefit from greater 
coordination. This study examines ambidexterity within this context to assess the robustness of 
this theory beyond its traditional context of for-profit firms. 
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Organization of the Dissertation 
This mixed-methods dissertation follows a sequential explanatory strategy (Ivankova, 
Creswell, & Stick, 2006). Sequential explanatory research begins with a preliminary quantitative 
study followed by a qualitative study that mirrors the pattern established by other organizational 
researchers (e.g. Edmondson, 1996; Novak & Sellnow, 2009; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988). This 
process first assesses the general pattern of relationships between the variables of interest and 
then follows with in-depth analysis of a subset from the full sample to understand more clearly 
the underlying mechanisms driving the quantitative results.  
This dissertation is comprised of six chapters. This first chapter has introduced the 
general research question and setting for the present study. Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
literature and the hypotheses developed for this study. Chapter 3 describes the research sample, 
methodology, and analytic techniques employed to answer the research questions and evaluate 
the hypotheses described above. Chapter 4 presents a discussion of the quantitative and 
qualitative findings of this study, as well as the caveats associated with this particular project and 
the challenges related to interpreting the hypothesis tests. Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the 
theoretical and managerial implications of this research and provides suggestions for future 





Chapter 2 – Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Organizational ambidexterity (OA) is a concept that describes the capability of firms that 
leverage efficient existing routines while simultaneously adapting to changing situations in order 
to pursue new growth opportunities (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). First 
conceptualized as the balance between the opposing forces of exploration and exploitation 
(Duncan, 1976), this concept has evolved from an organizational learning phenomenon 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991) to become known as OA (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), 
which has most recently received attention as a capability of key strategic importance for 
organizational performance (Eisenhardt et al., 2010). Some scholars even suggest that the 
ambidexterity hypothesis has gathered enough empirical support to be called an emerging 
research paradigm in organizational studies (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).  
Currently, researchers use different meanings and measures of OA across research 
settings, which makes comparisons of their findings difficult. The terms “exploration” and 
“exploitation” are used commonly in the ambidexterity literature (Gupta et al., 2006; Levinthal 
& March, 1993; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008), but scholars also refer to these pressures as the 
need to balance “search” with “stability” (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), “flexibility” with 
“efficiency” (Adler et al., 1999) and “alignment” with “adaptability” (Tiwana, 2008). Even with 
an agreed-upon lexicon for discussing these organizational pressures, many unsolved facets of 
the ambidexterity paradox remain, such as the role that time plays in ambidexterity and how 
different organizational structures influence these competing tensions (Simsek et al., 2009). 
Various streams of literature in the field of organization sciences have attempted to 
reconcile the two opposing forces of exploration and exploitation (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
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These themes of exploiting carefully refined routines for efficient operations while exploring 
new capabilities and offerings are now found in strategic management (Auh & Menguc, 2005; 
Burgelman, 1991; Ebben & Johnson, 2005), organizational learning (Gupta et al., 2005; He & 
Wong, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993), technological innovation (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2006) and organizational adaptation (Burgelman, 1991; Probst & Raisch, 2005). As 
literature continues to build in this area, we better understand the importance of carefully 
balancing these two processes; what remains less clear is how organizations actually engage in 
both processes (Adler et al., 2009). Much of the difficulty in achieving this balance is due to the 
inherent tension that organizations experience while trying to streamline operations and develop 
efficient processes throughout the organization to the detriment of the processes related to 
creative exploration (Cole & Matsumiya, 2007). Each of these two processes, exploration and 
exploitation, have been linked to organizational performance, but research suggests that the 
interactive effect of both is the key to long-term sustained performance (He & Wong, 2004 ) and 
longevity (De Geus, 2002; Piao, 2010). The juxtaposition of these two factors results in the 
matrix presented in Figure 1 and forms the basis for the quantitative portion of this study. 
Specializing in Efficiency or Exploration 
Organizational operations may improve through standard operating procedures and 
repeatable routines (Benner & Tushman, 2003). The application of rigorous scientific 
measurement applied to organizational tasks in the nascent field of management science sought 
the single best method (Taylor, 1911) to perform a task, such that workers would perform routine 
tasks in a consistent, optimal manner. This attention to replicability initially targeted tasks 
involving manual labor such as the handling of pig iron or the laying of bricks (Gilbreth & 
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Gilbreth, 1919), jobs that could be de-skilled into their component actions and subsequently 
timed, measured, and refined. These time and motion studies demonstrated that organizations 
that chose to pursue efficient operations with highly structured, repetitious tasks should produce 
greater levels of productivity; however, later studies determined that the routinization of tasks 
has the opposite effect on organizational productivity through its dehumanizing work conditions 
that may lead to worker burnout (Adler, 1993). Much of the early management research that 
focused on improving productivity and organizational performance attempted to replace 
idiosyncratic worker behaviors with repeatable, standardized, efficient operations; however, this 
minimized the variance in each individual’s contribution. Thus, as efficiency grows at the 
expense of new ideas or processes (Benner & Tushman, 2003), an organization’s overall ability 
to improve its standing in the environment could be compromised (De Geus, 2002; Levinthal & 
Myatt, 1994). 
Although the term “scientific management” has fallen by the wayside, its legacy lives on 
with efforts to streamline operations with standard operating procedures and continuous 
improvements to process management (Benner & Tushman, 2003). As actions develop into 
repeatable routines, organizations build competency and efficiency through repetition as learning 
effects accrue (Cohen, 1992). Even today, a number of popular programs (e.g., Six Sigma, ISO 
9000, de-layering, reengineering) focus exclusively on minimizing process variance and 
promoting standardization for organizational success (Benner & Tushman, 2003).  
Devoting time and energy to exploring new options comes at the cost of refining existing 
skills and routines (Levinthal & March, 1981), which, when coupled with a focus on efficient 
execution, can often result in returns that are sooner, surer, and easier (March, 1991). Hence, 
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organizations tend to favor these types of familiar routines rather than investing in riskier new 
processes that may yield unpredictable gains (Levinthal & March, 1993). These 
conceptualizations of ambidexterity imply a trade-off such that the pursuit of one strategy results 
in foregoing the other, which Abernathy (1978) termed the “productivity dilemma,” in which 
each strategy could only be pursued to the detriment of the other. In other words, by engaging in 
both strategies simultaneously, firms risk mediocre performance of each (March, 1991), rather 
than the reaping synergies found between them. Based on this conceptualization of exploration 
and exploitation as trade-offs under which higher performance benefits are reaped when firms 
refine their existing routines, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1a: Exploitation-focused organizations within Figure 1 (quadrant 2) will 
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt 
an ambidextrous strategy (quadrant 4). 
Early work on organizational learning assumed that exploration and exploitation were 
mutually exclusive trade-offs. To the extent that an organization excels at a particular skill, the 
attractiveness of improving a new capability—which may potentially cannibalize an existing 
capability—makes experimentation and innovation less attractive (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Conversely, work on this delicate balance suggests that ongoing development of efficient 
routines, coupled with the ability to adapt to major changes, is the key to long-term 
organizational survival (De Geus, 2002).  
The concept of the competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988; Liu, 2006) speaks to the 
unwavering refinement of existing competencies with little regard for the development of new 
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competencies. In these cases, core competencies actually become core rigidities (Leonard-
Barton, 1992) as organizations encounter difficulty adapting to changing environmental trends, 
customer demands, or technological changes. Many of the oldest companies still in existence 
have undergone major transformations over their lifetimes, and many had to destroy their core 
competencies altogether by changing industries or strategies order to survive (De Geus, 2002; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). Based on this conceptualization of exploration and exploitation as 
trade-offs, under which greater performance benefits accrue to firms that explore new markets 
and products (Piao, 2010), the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H1b: Exploration-focused organizations within Figure 1 (quadrant 3) will 
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt 
an ambidextrous strategy (quadrant 4). 
Reconciling Efficiency with Exploration – Organizational Ambidexterity 
 What began as the study of competing trade-offs in the organizational learning literature 
(Floyd & Lane, 2000; March, 1991) is now coalescing into its own research paradigm (Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). Recent research has taken the viewpoint that exploration and exploitation are 
orthogonal activities that do not require a trade-off; rather, these two actions can positively 
interact (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Uotila et al., 2009). This opens the door to the possibility of 
engaging in both rather than having to choose one focus over the other. Instead of 
conceptualizing ambidexterity as a trade-off between two mutually exclusive options, the view 
of these pressures as orthogonal, rather than continuous, has led to a conceptualization of OA as 
a paradox (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).  
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A growing body of theoretical and empirical research has refined the concept of OA in an 
attempt to ascertain its antecedents, moderators, outcomes, and contextual boundaries (Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek, 2009). In fact, two thorough review articles (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008; Simsek et al., 2009) detail the dramatic advancement of the concept of OA across more 
than twenty empirical articles that have attempted to isolate the antecedents (Beckman, 2006; 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004b; Kyriakopoulos & Moorman, 2004), moderators (Ebben & 
Johnson, 2005; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001) and outcomes (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Han, 
Kim, & Kim, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002) of ambidextrous operations. Studies have examined 
firms in Korea (Han et al., 2001), Singapore (He & Wong, 2004), China (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 
2001), the Netherlands (Kyriakopoulos & Moorman, 2004), Spain (Revilla, Prieto, & Rodriguez, 
2011) and the United States (Bierly & Daly, 2007; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2006). The robustness of 
this theory can be seen clearly through the variety of these studies that expand the boundaries 
and applicability of OA across contexts.  
The synthesis of this literature stream has produced a new typology of ambidextrous 
behavior types (Simsek et al., 2009). Although it is possible to engage in these two competing 
actions simultaneously within a single structural unit, splitting the structural and temporal 
dimensions apart to resolve the inherent tension between these two demands results in four 
possible types of ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009). The temporal facet of ambidexterity 
focuses on whether organizations pursue exploration and exploitation simultaneously or 
sequentially. The structural facet of ambidexterity focuses on whether organizations pursue 
exploration and exploitation within a singular organizational structure or across multiple 
structures. Juxtaposing these two facets yields four possible combinations for understanding OA, 
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and by shifting the time and place that these two paradoxical cognitive approaches occur, this 
research has attempted to tease out the underlying processes within OA to better understand how 
these pressures are able to co-exist. The development of this typology offers a way beyond the 
mindset that exploration and exploitation are trade-offs to focus future ambidexterity research 
onto more systematic investigations of the specific processes, structures, and contexts that 
facilitate OA (Simsek et al., 2009).  
Table 1 presents an overview of quantitative studies that have linked OA to different 
outcomes using a variety of research methods and industry contexts. Inclusion criteria for this 
table were a quantitative or mixed methods study design and OA as an independent variable in 
the study. The following section details some of the key research findings from this literature 
stream, as well as opportunities that have yet to be explored and the hypotheses that emerge from 
the unanswered questions in the literature.    
Antecedents of Ambidexterity 
Given its generally favorable relationship with organizational outcomes (Venkatraman et 
al., 2007), researchers and managers are interested in better understanding the conditions that 
facilitate OA.  
Contextual Antecedents 
The organizational context is comprised of the systems, processes, and beliefs that shape 
individual-level behaviors within an organization (Burgelman, 1983; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994). 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) proposed four key interpersonal aspects of the organizational 
context for developing a culture of ambidexterity: discipline, stretch, support, and trust. 
Discipline asks organizational members to contribute more than the minimum in order to achieve 
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organizational goals. Promoting stretch within an organization pushes members to pursue more 
ambitious goals, rather than focusing on safe and predictable ones. Support allows individuals to 
assist each other and to gain access to needed resources. Finally, trust requires that organizational 
members honor the commitments they make so that others can rely on them to accomplish 
needed goals. The concept of trust, echoed in later work (Adler et al., 1999), as well as worker 
training and job enrichment, has been found to facilitate effective work across multiple 
situations. These contextual and behavior factors do not automatically create ambidextrous 
organizations (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004a), but they do permit ambidexterity to emerge as 
organizational members engage in these practices. 
Leadership Antecedents 
Research focusing on the leadership aspects that facilitate ambidexterity has explored the 
concept of ambidextrous managers as well as how a CEO’s functional background influences 
ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; 2007). In this sense, the concept of ambidexterity 
resides in a manager’s mind and experience rather than in the specific structures or processes put 
in place to engage in both actions at once (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Beckman (2006) 
describes how founding team composition and former company affiliations influence exploitive 
and exploratory behavior. Lubatkin and colleagues (2006) also look at top management 
characteristics that may influence OA and suggest that smaller firms may benefit more 
ambidexterity based on individual characteristics (Chang & Hughes, 2012) and cognitions 
(Thongpapanl, De Clercq, & Dimov, 2012) rather than structurally-driven factors such as 
creating separate units to pursue different goals. Other interpersonal factors, such as decision-
making authority at the managerial level, increase the likelihood of managerial ambidexterity 
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(Mom, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). Decision autonomy also strengthens the relationship 
between adaptability and organizational performance (Thongpapanl et al., 2012), suggesting that 
providing individuals with more opportunities to engage in novel behaviors will increase their 
likelihood of exploratory actions. Different managerial leadership styles also influence OA; 
middle managers can facilitate exploitative learning through a transactional leadership style and 
top managers can facilitate explorative learning through a transformational leadership style (Sun 
& Anderson, 2012).  
Structural Antecedents 
Studies of OA’s structural antecedents downplay the effects of the top management team, 
board of directors, and other members of the organization’s upper echelon to focus on the 
organization itself as the key actor (He & Wong, 2004). Spatial separation offers one way to 
reconcile the tension between exploration and exploitation. The act of physically moving units 
with different goals farther from the rest of the organization (e.g., PARC Xerox, Lockheed 
Martin Skunkworks) permits some parts of the organization to focus on exploratory goals while 
other parts of the organization focus on exploitative goals. The use of loose coupling between 
different types of work units permits different goals, management styles, and incentive plans to 
drive the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). 
Structural antecedents to ambidexterity focus on how parallel structures allow organizational 
members to switch between different structures depending on specific tasks. Processes such as 
outsourcing are also ways to offload exploitation processes. In the Internet banking industry, the 
use of outsourcing positively influences efficiency but negatively influences adaptability 
(Weigelt & Sarkar, 2012). In addition to the physical location and layout of organizations, other 
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structural factors, such as the degree of informal connectedness between organizational members 
and the degree of work unit formalization, also influence ambidextrous operations (Jansen, 
Tempelaar, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). In this same setting, highly-centralized 
decision-making structures can negatively impact exploratory innovation. Structured hierarchical 
replication processes, such as those at IKEA, permit variance at the individual store level, but the 
organizational structure minimizes variance at higher levels in order to ensure consistency in 
values, vision, and image across different locations (Jonsson & Foss, 2012). These direct effects 
provide an understanding of the factors that influence the likelihood of ambidextrous behaviors 
occurring. In addition to describing the types of structures, leaders, and contexts that influence 
OA, other research has examined the different types of moderators that influence the relationship 
between OA and a variety of outcomes.  
Moderators of Ambidexterity 
 Many studies have also explored the contingent relationships that interact to influence the 
impact of ambidextrous organizational operations on organizational performance. Consistent 
with the idea of a liability of newness (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983), the liability of 
senescence (Ruef, 2002), or firm age, has been shown to negatively impact the relationship 
between ambidextrous operations and firm sales growth (Venkatraman et al., 2007). Firm size 
has also been empirically determined to be a moderator of the relationship between product 
development path and the number of products on the market (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). 
Larger firms typically have more rigid routines that make ambidextrous operations more 
difficult, but some of these challenges may be overcome with effective alliance portfolios (Lavie, 
Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011). Levels of exploitation moderate the relationship between exploration 
18 
  
and strategic learning (Sirén, Kohtamäki, & Kuckertz, 2012), suggesting that the most effective 
learning occurs when exploration is coupled with the utility derived from exploiting new 
knowledge. Additionally, the proportion of shareholders representing particular global regions 
moderates the relationship between exploitation and strategic renewal (Kwee, Van Den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2011), suggesting that particular stakeholder blocs may be more receptive to the 
exploratory actions necessary for growth. In addition to these organizational-level factors, many 
individual-level factors also influence the relationship between OA and organizational 
performance, including the orientation of customer service representatives (Jasmand, Blazevic, 
& de Ruyer, 2012), the degree of task conflict (Kostopoulous & Bozionelos, 2011), the 
behavioral complexity of top management teams (Carmeli & Halevi, 2009), and informal 
personal coordination between organizational members (Mom et al., 2009).  
 Finally, externalities that moderate the impact of OA on performance include factors such 
as environmental competitiveness, which positively impacts the relationship between exploratory 
innovation and financial performance, and environmental dynamism which negatively impacts 
the relationship between exploitive innovation and financial performance (Jansen et al., 2009). In 
addition to these antecedents and moderators of OA, other research has explored the impact of 
OA on performance outcomes at a variety of levels of analysis.  
Outcomes of Ambidexterity 
One of the prime goals of any organization, long-term survival (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 
2009; De Geus, 2002; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) is a result of ambidextrous operations. 
Beyond a systematic mindset towards continual renewal, adaptation, and growth, OA has also 
been empirically linked with performance outcomes such as a greater number of products on the 
market (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), sales growth within the software industry (Venkatraman et 
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al., 2007), and new product development (Revilla et al., 2011). Hill and Birkinshaw (2006) also 
found support for a positive relationship between ambidexterity and venture unit performance 
and He and Wong (2004) found support for an interactive effect between exploration and 
exploitation when studying the effect of ambidexterity on sales growth rates. Ambidextrous 
behaviors have been linked to lower levels of efficiency in a sample of customer service 
representatives (Jasmand et al., 2012), which supports the view of exploration and exploitation as 
trade-offs, but these findings are outweighed by many other studies that report positive outcomes 
of ambidexterity. 
Despite the overwhelmingly positive support for ambidexterity’s effects on 
organizational performance, three studies reported non-significant relationships or were unable 
to support the interaction of exploration and exploitation on performance (Ambrosini, Bowman, 
& Schoenberg, 2011; Bierly & Daly, 2007; Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 2007). These findings add 
support to the idea that these concepts may not be orthogonal, even though other studies 
(Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Katila & Ahuja, 2002) find support for a significant interactive effect of 
exploration and exploitation on organizational performance. With a few exceptions, the 
empirical studies presented in Table 1 report positive relationships between ambidexterity and a 
range of organizational outcomes. As a result of the findings typically reported in this body of 
literature, the following hypotheses are offered:  
H1a’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will 
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt 
an exploitation focus (Quadrant 2). 
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H1b’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will 
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt 
an exploration focus (Quadrant 3). 
 The overall positive impact of ambidexterity on organizational performance also permits 
the following hypothesis regarding the lack of either focus or balance: 
H2: Organizations with equally low levels of exploration and exploitation 
(Quadrant 1) experience the lowest financial performance. 
 Finally, in order to assess the overall impact of ambidexterity on financial performance, 
the following hypothesis is offered:  
H3: Organizational ambidexterity will have a significant, positive effect on 
financial performance. 
Synthesizing and Extending Organizational Ambidexterity 
 To date, OA research has focused on the for-profit sector, excluding NFPs entirely. High-
tech industries such as software development (Venkatraman et al., 2007), new product design 
(Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), robotics (Katila & Ahuja, 2002), and biotechnology (Rothaermel 
& Deeds, 2004) are common settings for empirical tests of OA. These types of industries, where 
creativity, innovation, and efficient production are all necessary, may make the impact of OA 
more direct. Methodologically, most studies have either employed case-study or survey-based 
approaches to determine an organization’s ambidextrous abilities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004a). 
More recent studies (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Kwee et al., 2011; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2011; Sun & Anderson, 2012) have begun to incorporate qualitative methods to delve deeper 
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into the processes and mindsets found in ambidextrous organizations. Although this research has 
been helpful in clarifying the concepts central to OA as well as the impact of OA on 
organizational performance, a major context that remains unexplored is that of NFPs.  
Although the mission of NFPs is radically different from that of for-profit firms, NFPs 
must also compete for scarce resources (Stone & Crittenden, 1993), develop novel strategies to 
ensure their ongoing survival and relevance (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009), and deliver adequate 
performance levels to satisfy various stakeholders (Kaplan, 2001). Given the similar demands yet 
contradictory outcomes desired, as well as the increasing need to improve NFP performance 
(Herman & Renz, 1998), knowledge of how OA influences performance within this sector seems 
particularly appropriate. Because continued survival alone is, at best, a weak indicator of 
efficiency, effectiveness, or social impact (Dees, 1998), NFPs are coming under greater pressure 
from various stakeholder groups to efficiently use resources (e.g., cash donations, gifts, 
volunteers) to accomplish the organization’s stated mission (Salamon et al., 2010) and must also 
effectively communicate their successes to various stakeholder groups. The modern environment 
requires non-profits to seek novel funding sources, engage in new forms of outreach to 
communicate with members, develop new measures for effectiveness (Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 
2003; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001), implement practices and reports that facilitate transparency 
and accountability (Herman, Renz, & Heimovics, 1996; Speckbacher, 2003), and begin to 
incorporate best practices from the for-profit business world. Extending the OA paradigm from 
strategic management to NFPs offers an opportunity to understand if and how this sector is 




Literature Review Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the relevant literature related to OA within the 
strategic management literature. A review of current research, both empirical and conceptual, 
shows a paucity of literature outside the for-profit domain, suggesting that the present study 
offers a contribution by extending this well-known strategic management concept to a unique 
and important context. The following chapter presents the methods used to test the three 
hypotheses stated above, the measures used to operationalize each of the variables within the 
study, the control variables that will be included to minimizing confounding, and a discussion of 





Chapter 3 – Methods and Context 
 This chapter presents the methodology used to conduct this study. A general overview of 
the unique not-for-profit context is provided, with a discussion of the inherent difficulties that 
researchers encounter while attempting to relate NFP activities to organizational performance or 
effectiveness. This chapter also describes the sample, measures, and data collection process and 
concludes with an explanation of the statistical analyses employed. 
 The recent focus on NFPs as a force for improving communities and alleviating major 
social issues has received a great deal of recent attention from academics (Calás, Smircich, & 
Bourne, 2009; Dart, 2004; Korosec & Berman, 2006; Tan, Williams, & Tan, 2005) and 
practitioners (Geller, Abramson, & de Leon, 2010; Salamon et al., 2010) interested in 
ameliorating persistent social problems. The non-profit and charitable sectors of the United 
States economy are comprised of more than 1.5 million organizations, employ nearly 10% of the 
workforce (12.9 million individuals), and contribute more than 5% of the overall gross domestic 
product ($1.4 trillion in total revenue) (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2009). These organizations cover 
the full spectrum of organizational missions and range from highly specialized local charities 
(e.g., Knox Area Rescue Ministries, Virginia Beach SPCA) to nationwide organizations that 
oversee the efforts of multiple chapters (e.g., Red Cross, Planned Parenthood, Habitat for 
Humanity).  
The changing face of government and its shrinking role in the provision of social and 
welfare services in the United States necessitate the expansion of services offered by non-profit 
and charitable organizations (Boris & Steuerle, 1999; Salamon, 1995; Smith & Lipsky, 1993) in 
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order to alleviate social issues (e.g., homelessness, hunger) or improve artistic or cultural 
offerings (e.g., symphonies, zoos, botanical gardens). Performance measurement has not always 
been highly valued in the world of charity and social improvement (Dees, 2007; Speckbacher, 
2008), largely due to the difficulty in reporting reliable, timely, and cost-effective results. Failure 
to efficiently allocate funds to the organization’s stated mission results in rebuke from the NFP 
rating community, such as this warning to donors found on the rating website VolunteerGuide:  
“For every dollar you donate, very good charities will use 80 cents 
or more towards their charitable purpose, while the rest of your 
donation pays for fundraising costs, administrative expenses, and 
management salaries. On the other hand, for every dollar donated 
to a bad charity, as little as 40 cents (or worse) will go towards the 
charitable purpose. The rest of your donation will pay for a poorly 
managed or inefficient bureaucracy, perhaps with the involvement 
of too many for-profit middlemen in the fundraising efforts,” 
(volunteerguide.com, emphasis added).  
VolunteerGuide provides no explanation for why 80 cents determines the cutoff point 
between very good and good charities and all attempts to contact the organization’s 
administrators for clarification on their methodology have gone unanswered. CN offers a similar 
warning to donors: “We believe that those spending less than a third of their budget on program 
expenses are simply not living up to their missions. Charities demonstrating such gross 
inefficiency receive zero points for their overall organizational efficiency score,” (emphasis 
added). Like VolunteerGuide, CN offers no rationale for 33 cents on the dollar as the 
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determinant of “gross inefficiency.” This unwavering emphasis on efficiently delivering services 
and having expense ratios reported by third-party organizations places pressure on NFPs to 
report high levels of efficiency (Tinkelman, 2009); however, OA suggests that these same 
organizations must resist the temptation to simply cut expenses to the bone and risk falling into a 
competency trap (Liu, 2006) whereby they are unable to adapt their service offerings as needed. 
In order to ensure their long-term survival, NFPs must be flexible enough to respond to changing 
conditions within the greater environment as new opportunities and threats arise (Sherlock & 
Gravelle, 2009), which are often riskier and more expensive (March, 1991), and potentially less 
efficient in terms of reported expense ratios. 
NFPs are facing greater limits of social support and must meet expectations for delivering 
services efficiently while growing and innovating (Salamon et al., 2010). Despite these demands, 
unlike their for-profit counterparts, NFPs are often locked into narrow, mission-based offerings 
with limited ability to diversify beyond their stated mission without facing backlash from donors, 
board members, and volunteers (Salamon et al., 2010). Even without the ambidexterity 
terminology in the NFP literature, the sentiment that NFPs must balance the need for new and 
innovative programs with existing service provisions is expressed by the comments reported in a 
recent Johns Hopkins University study on non-profit innovation and performance measurement. 
In the words of one frustrated executive director:  
“Innovation can be challenging when private funders have 
committed to organizations based on what they know already 
works. Funders are mixed about whether or not they are willing to 
take risks on innovation. Risk taking is a general challenge in our 
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sector and needs to, when appropriate, be rewarded not penalized 
when something doesn’t work 100 percent,” (Salamon et al., 2010: 
17) 
A second executive director expressed the need to explore new options for the 
organization, but felt constrained by the boundaries of the organization’s mission and the need to 
focus on existing services instead of new opportunities:  
“Innovation is great, and I support it, but there is also a huge need 
for funding to support the programs (that get more expensive every 
year) that are part of our current operations. I think it is a 
dangerous practice to encourage innovation when organizations are 
finding it hard to sustain their core mission due to difficulty in 
attracting funding for basic operating costs (Salamon et al., 2010: 
17). 
Because of these competing pressures to continue with existing programs while also 
seeking new innovations in the field, managers may find themselves overwhelmed at having to 
pursue both simultaneously. These quotes mirror the inherent tension within the ambidexterity 
literature, but couch the trade-offs in terms unique to the NFP sector. As organizations seek to 
broaden their impact, pursue new funding opportunities, or increase their visibility, they must 
temper this growth and exploration with an expectation from stakeholders that the first goal is to 
provide demanded services and products with a high level of efficiency. This perception that the 
organization must explore innovative new missions in order to keep the organization relevant is 
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also noted in this quote from an executive director who understands the need to do both, but is 
hampered by a lack of time and staffing to actually capitalize on exploration: 
“Staff time is a huge problem, not just time to attend conferences 
or read periodicals, but the time that’s necessary afterward, to 
digest, think about how to apply / implement what one has 
learned,” (Salamon et al., 2010: 8). 
In this regard, the executive director is describing an organization that, even if it had the 
resources to actively explore for new options, would be limited in its ability to exploit them 
effectively afterwards. This “failure trap” (March, 2003; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006) is common 
in cases where a lack of adequate exploitation results in failure, thus spurring more exploration 
and a constant shifting of different strategies to find one that will work with minimal 
exploitation. This tension, especially within these types of organizations with scarce resources, 
demanding stakeholder groups, and a commitment to a constraining mission, makes the concept 
of ambidexterity particularly relevant to an NFP context. Many for-profit organizations cope 
with the same constraints, but under a mandate to maximize shareholder or owner value, may 
engage in very different activities as a way to generate revenue. The constraints from the stated 
mission make it difficult for NFPs to explore too widely beyond the scope of their organizational 
goals, but NFP managers likely still need to engage in both actions for continued success. 
Linking the use of OA practices to an objective, measureable outcome would prove beneficial in 
a sector traditionally plagued by performance measurement challenges (Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 
2003; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001) because NFP managers would be able to point to the 
demonstrable impact of efficiently seeking new growth opportunities.  
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Challenges in Assessing NFP Effectiveness 
 Given criticism in the for-profit strategy literature of the unwavering focus on 
performance (Cameron, 1986), the NFP arena is a particularly fertile area for exploration 
because performance is both a poorly-defined topic (Rojas, 2000; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001) 
and one of great interest to NFP managers (Herman & Renz, 1998), volunteers (Murnighan, 
Kim, & Metzger, 1993), donors (Salamon et al., 2010), and watchdog organizations (Szper & 
Prakash, 2011). These various stakeholder groups are only able to assess the organization’s 
effectiveness at achieving its stated mission if information is made available about ongoing 
efforts (Speckbacher, 2003). The topics of measurable progress and impact, accountability, and 
organizational effectiveness are of interest to practitioners and scholars alike (Ritchie & 
Kolodinsky, 2003; Rojas, 2000), but these topics also defy measurement in a way few variables 
do (Herman & Renz, 1998; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001), which has led some scholars to 
wonder if the task of measuring NFP performance is even possible (Sawhill & Williamson, 
2001).  
Clearly, one of the main challenges of assessing NFP effectiveness is that the “simple 
elegance of a financial measure” (Kaplan, 2001: 354) of organizational performance is not 
applicable. Common accounting-based ratio measures employed in traditional strategy literature 
such as return on assets (ROA), return on investment (ROI), return on sales (ROS), as well as 
market-based measures such as Tobin’s Q and market capitalization are all irrelevant within an 
NFP context. In response to these challenges, models have emerged in an attempt to measure 
organizational effectiveness rather than performance (Balser & McClusky, 2005; Herman & 
Renz, 1998; Kushner & Poole, 1996; Rojas, 2000).  
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Rather than attempt to measure NFP performance using traditional financial measures 
typically seen in strategy literature, other measures of organizational effectiveness have been 
proposed (Cameron, 1986), and the ultimate choice of measure is driven by the organization’s 
idiosyncratic goals and mission (Herman & Renz, 1998). One shortcoming of this approach is 
that organizations can rate themselves and benchmark their own efforts against their stated goals, 
but outsiders unfamiliar with the terminology of a particular NFP cannot easily compare 
different organizations.  
 When case studies are used to focus on one particular organization’s attempt at defining 
measureable goals, researchers report dozens of metrics that organizations use to track their 
performance, few of which may be applicable to another organization (Sawhill & Williamson, 
2001). For example, the leadership at The Nature Conservancy spent one year developing a list 
of ninety-eight performance indicators. While some measures were generic enough to permit 
comparison to other organizations (e.g., dollars raised per capita, percentage of operating budget 
spent on fundraising), many others were Conservancy-specific (e.g., number of acres acquired 
for protection). Unfortunately, these contextually-specific measures can lead to “even greater 
fractioning of knowledge and incommensurability of theories and findings,” (Herman & Renz, 
1999: 122). 
 Other methods that have attempted to introduce more rigorous and generalizable 
performance measurement to the NFP sector include the balanced scorecard (Kaplan, 2001), 
which focuses on different stakeholder metrics such as customer needs, organizational learning 
and growth, economic value, and internal organizational processes. The competing values 
framework (CVF) (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Quinn & Spreitzer, 1991) uses multi-dimensional 
30 
  
scaling to map values into a 2x2 matrix of different effectiveness models based on organizational 
goals and resulted in four possible models: human relations, internal process, open systems, and 
rational goals. Each model has its own underlying values for rating organizational effectiveness. 
Bhargava and Sinha (1992) use a four-factor model to predict organizational effectiveness. 
Seven-point Likert-type scales assess the level of production, leadership, interpersonal conflict, 
and commitment within the organization. Taken together, these components represent an 
individual’s perception of how effective an organization is in its performance of its stated 
mission. The multiple constituency model assumes that various organizational stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1983) all desire different outcomes from the organization and the extent to which 
NFPs can meet these various dimensions will influence stakeholder perceptions of effectiveness 
(Zammuto, 1984). This model is adequate for case study research and offers the ability to focus 
on one particular organization’s determination of its own level of effectiveness. For larger-scale 
empirical work that generalizes across contexts, a common measure of organizational 
effectiveness is required for comparisons within and between groups of NFPs.  
More recent research on NFP performance measurement has addressed this issue by 
developing financial measures of NFP performance that are comparable across contexts. The use 
of measures based on common data such as IRS filings permits cross-context comparison, long-
term benchmarking, and a common vocabulary for organizational researchers (Ritchie & 
Kolodinsky, 2003). By developing ratios related to fundraising expenses, executive 
compensation, and growth potential, donors can compare organizations across a common set of 
metrics. With these types of measures, NFP researchers, donors, and managers can begin to 
31 
  
incorporate financial measurement terminology into their strategic plans as easily as for-profit 
managers incorporate terms such as “return on assets” and “return on sales.” 
The Rise of Not-for-profit Watchdog Organizations 
Assessing NFP effectiveness has been mired in a lack of transparency and objectivity 
(Szper & Prakash, 2011) and, because the direct social impact of any particular program is 
difficult to measure, NFP stakeholders can experience difficulty ascertaining how efficiently 
resources are being used, the organization’s prospects for growth, and the appropriate level of 
executive compensation. In the absence of traditional market-based measures of organizational 
effectiveness (Kaplan, 2001), third-party organizations have emerged to parse financial and 
perceptual data from NFPs into usable effectiveness metrics for consumption by various 
stakeholders, including donors, volunteers, board members, and funding agencies (Szper & 
Prakash, 2011). These metrics are comparable across different organizations and permit easy 
comparisons of NFPs. The overall aim of NFP watchdog organizations is to provide stakeholders 
with information about how organizations are performing relative to other organizations within 
the same scope of operations. Watchdog organizations that issue ratings based on financial 
metrics typically rely on the data contained in IRS filings that all 501(c)(3) NFPs are required to 
file. Form 990 financial information is a commonly used and widely-accepted data source for 
NFP research (Herman & Renz, 1998; Herman, Renz, & Heimovics, 1996; Hwang & Powell, 
2009; Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003). These organizations then interpret the IRS forms, analyze 
the operational data, and report it back to donors, board members, community leaders, and 
volunteers in a standardized, comparable format that is easier to understand. The purpose of 
these ratings is similar to those of creditworthiness ratings assessed by companies such as 
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Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s, where the overall goal of the rating agency is to provide 
analysis and guidance from industry experts so that donors, volunteers, boards, and executives 
can make more informed decisions. By improving the transparency of NFP operations through 
the dissemination of financial data and subsequent ratings, watchdog organizations attempt to 
influence donor and NFP behavior (Szper & Prakash, 2011). One of the largest and oldest NFP 
watchdog is CN—the primary data source for this study.  
Description of Charity Navigator 
Founded in 2001, CN is a 501(c)(3) NFP itself and one of many watchdog organizations 
that have emerged in recent years as a way to add transparency to the NFP arena (Szper & 
Prakash, 2011). As of 2012, CN provided ratings on more than 5,500 NFPs. NFPs are 
categorized into one of nine broad categories (e.g., human services, animals, health) and then 
further subcategorized into one of thirty-four narrower causes (e.g., food banks, wildlife 
conservation, medical research) based on the activity code reported to the IRS on the 990 form. 
In order to be included within the CN database, NFPs must be classified as a 501(c)(3) 
organization and file a 990 form. CN requires that organizations have at least four years of 990 
forms on file. Organizations must be based in the United States, but may perform work 
internationally as part of their mission. Public support must exceed $500,000 and total 
contributions must equal a minimum of $1,000,000 in the latest year of Form 990 filings. From 
these inclusion criteria, CN rates approximately 6% of NFPs within the United States. Upon 
receipt of the publicly-available 990 form data, CN presents it in a way that is uniform, 
comparable, and more accessible to donors and other NFP stakeholders. Donors, managers, 
board members, and other stakeholders can then use these ratings as a benchmarking metric to 
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compare across NFPs. Figure 2 presents an example of a CN ratings report. CN focuses on rating 
growth potential and efficient operations for NFPs, but stops short of relating these two 
constructs to a meaningful performance outcome. 
Based on its history of presenting publicly-available financial data for the purposes of 
influencing NFP and stakeholder behavior (Tinkelman, 2009), as well as its accepted use in other 
empirical studies of NFPs (Andreoni & Payne, 2011; Gordon, Knock, & Neely, 2009; Seo, Kim, 
& Yang, 2009; Szper & Prakash, 2011), CN permits data for evaluating the ambidexterity 
hypothesis (Simsek et al., 2009) within a NFP context. Prior studies that have used CN data have 
either looked at NFPs in one state (Szper & Prakash, 2011) or one particular industry (Seo et al., 
2009). This is the first study to take a broad look across the entire dataset to examine patterns of 
ambidextrous operations and their relationship to fiscal performance within NFPs. This large 
sample that encompasses various causes allows for the examination of the relationship between 
these two concepts and their relationship to an organization’s financial performance.  
Study 1 Methods and Context 
For the quantitative portion of this study, data were collected from the CN database 
during February and March of 2011, reflecting the most current ratings on file for each of the 
NFPs in the database. These data report financial filings for fiscal year 2010 and prior. Although 
CN makes the 990 form data available on their website, these data are not presented in a way that 
makes comparison or analysis straight-forward. The inability to download the CN dataset in its 
entirety necessitated use of the Visual Web Ripper (sequentum.com) data extraction program. 
Visual Web Ripper extracts data from user-selected portions of web pages and organizes the 
output into spreadsheets for the purposes of conducting additional statistical analyses. Figure 3 
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contains an image of the Visual Web Ripper tool and highlights to portions of the webpage that 
for inclusion in a spreadsheet for the purposes of statistical analysis. 
Research Design and Quantitative Analytic Techniques 
This research seeks to understand the phenomenon of ambidexterity within a sample of 
NFP organizations by examining the CN dataset for patterns related to the OA and to identify the 
impact on ambidextrous operations on financial performance.  
Study 1 Variables and Description of Measures 
CN calculates ratings for NFPs from by analyzing official IRS Form 990 data and parsing 
the financial data into meaningful comparisons. The two financial measures, organizational 
efficiency and organizational capacity, approximate the competing pressures first laid out by 
March (1991) and further refined by contemporary scholars who continue to use the language of 
exploration and exploitation in their studies of OA (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch, 
Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009; Simsek et al., 2009).  
Organizational Efficiency (Exploitation) 
The first independent variable, exploitation, is described by March as activities such as 
“refinement, efficiency, selection, and implementation” (March, 1991: 102, emphasis added), and 
is measured by CN’s rating of organizational efficiency (OE). OE is one of the two major areas 
rated by CN. According to CN, “analyzing a charity’s efficiency reveals how well it functions 
day to day. Charities that are efficient spend less money to raise more. They devote the majority 
of their spending to the programs and services they exist to provide” (charitynavigator.org). OE 
demonstrates a high degree of theoretical correspondence with the concept of exploitation 
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(March, 1991) in that it attempts to measure the degree to which contributions are being 
efficiently applied to the organization’s ongoing operations within the stated mission.  
OE is determined by four underlying financial ratios: program expenses, administrative 
expenses, fundraising expenses, and fundraising efficiency. A rating for program expenses is 
calculated by dividing direct program expenses by total functional expenses (the sum of a 
charity’s program expenses, administrative expenses and fundraising expenses) to determine a 
percentage. Higher percentages are rated more favorably by CN. A rating for administrative 
expenses is calculated by dividing administrative expenses (executive compensation and other 
staff salaries) by total functional expenses. For this measure, lower percentages are rated more 
favorably by CN.A rating for fundraising expenses is calculated by dividing an organization’s 
fundraising expenses by its total functional expenses. For this measure, lower percentages are 
rated more favorably by CN. A rating for fundraising efficiency is calculated by dividing an 
NFP’s fundraising expenses by its total contributions. For this measure, lower percentages are 
rated more favorably by CN. 
Each of these four categories is worth 10 possible points. The sum of the ratings from 
these four sub-categories results in overall OE ratings that range from 0-40 points. In cases 
where an NFP spends less than 33% of their total budget on program expenses, CN automatically 
gives these organizations a zero (0) for organizational efficiency. This portion of the rating 
methodology shows the bias towards organizations who are not operating at the peak of 
efficiency, although such levels of efficiency may actually be detrimental to overall effectiveness 
(Adler, 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2003). 
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Organizational Capacity (Exploration) 
The second major area that CN rates is organizational capacity (OC). March 
conceptualizes exploration as “search, variation, experimentation, and discovery,” (1991: 102) 
and the OC rating accurately taps this future-oriented posture by defining OC as “how well a 
charity is positioned to pursue long-term systematic change. They have the financial flexibility to 
plan strategically and pursue long-term objectives. These charities can more ambitiously address 
our nation’s challenges, envisioning and working toward long-term solutions” 
(charitynavigator.org, emphasis added). Higher OC ratings indicate an ability to “continue 
pursuing change in the future and will generate both short-term and long-term results for every 
dollar they receive from givers.”  
OC is determined by calculating the four-year average of two financial ratios: primary 
revenue growth, primary expenses growth, plus an assessment of an NFP’s working capital ratio. 
Primary revenue growth includes donor-based contributions, corporate donations, and grants. 
Growing these revenue streams over time demonstrates that NFPs are maintaining support for 
their programs and will continue to operate in the future. Primary expenses growth demonstrates 
that programs are reaching a larger audience, continuing to fulfill a need, and developing new 
programs as needed. The methods for rating primary revenue growth and primary expenses 
growth are the same: these growth rates are calculated by computing the annualized growth rate 
for both measures is [(Yn/Y0)
(1/n)]-1 where Y0 is the value measured in the first year of the 
interval and n is the length of the interval in years. CN uses proprietary conversion tables to 
translate the calculated growth rates into ratings for this aspect of OC. The ratings indicate how 
close an NFP is to industry standards and how it compares with the other charities in the dataset. 
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For these measures, higher percentages are rated more favorably by CN and NFPs may earn up 
to 10 points for each category.  
A rating for working capital ratio is calculated by dividing working capital by total 
expenses. Working capital assets include cash, savings, accounts receivables, grants receivable, 
pledges receivable, and investments in securities. Liabilities include accounts payables, accrued 
expenses, and grants payable. This measure provides an estimate of how long an NFP could 
continue to engage in operations without generating any new revenue. NFPs may earn up to 10 
points for their working capital ratio and similar to the measures of primary revenue growth and 
primary expenses growth, CN converts the raw working capital ratio to a rating using 
proprietary, industry-specific ratings tables. The sum of these three sub-categories results in 
overall OC ratings that range from 0-30 points. 
Controlling for Industry Differences 
After determining the raw percentages for each dimension of OE and OC, CN applies an 
industry-specific algorithm to convert the four measures into one rating. To permit cross-industry 
comparison, ratings are adjusted to reflect industry norms. For example, in the food banking 
industry, in order to receive the highest possible rating for the administrative expenses 
subcategory of OE, a food bank must keep their administrative expenses between 0% and 3% of 
total functional expense (the sum of a charity’s program expenses, administrative expenses and 
fundraising expenses). Thus, for a food bank with total functional expenses of $1,000,000, staff 
salaries must remain below $30,000 in order to earn the full 10 points for this rating; however, a 
museum must may report administrative expenses up to 17.5% and still receive the highest rating 
for this portion from CN. Although an administrative expense rating of 15% would yield a food 
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bank 0 points from CN for this measure, a museum with the same expense ratio would receive 
the full 10 points possible for this measure. These types of industry-adjusted ratings allow for 
comparisons between NFPs within the same industry as well as NFPs across diverse industries.  
Creating a Measure of Organizational Ambidexterity 
 Consistent with prior OA research (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Katila & Ahuja, 2002), the 
measures for OC and OE are multiplied to create a measure of OA. By conceptualizing these as 
orthogonal constructs rather than trade-offs, it is possible for an organizational to engage in high 
levels of both exploration and exploitation. The range of possible ratings is from 0-40 for OE and 
0-30 for OC and the product of these two measures ranges from 0 to 1200. 
Across the entire dataset, the mean score for exploration was 16.17 on a scale from 0 to 
30 and the mean score for exploitation was 35.39 on a scale from 0 to 40. This mean split 
resulted in 1,054 to 1,975 NFPs per quadrant. By categorizing organizations into quadrants based 
on these mean-split values, it is possible to compare the average level of fiscal performance 
between the NFPs that inhabit the different quadrants. This classification yields an understanding 
of how many organizations out of the total sample exhibit ambidextrous behavior. If the sample 
were normally distributed, each quadrant would contain approximately 1,300 NFPs; however, 
given the difficulty of achieving ambidexterity reported in the literature (Adler et al., 2009; 
Benner & Tushman, 2003), it is surprising that so many NFPs within the CN dataset can be 
classified as ambidextrous organizations. Table 2 presents a partial correlation matrix with 
descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. Table 3 presents a full correlation matrix 
including the industries in the CN dataset. Table 4 presents a description of the sectors and 




The dependent variable in this study is fiscal performance (FP), a ratio measure derived 
from IRS Form 990 data and calculated as an NFP’s total revenue (line 12) divided by total 
expenses (line 17). The resulting ratio represents an NFP operating at a state of surplus or deficit; 
an FP greater than 1.0 represents a state of surplus and an FP less than 1.0 represents a state of 
deficit. For NFPs, a state of surplus is highly desirable for a number of reasons, including 
providing a buffer against environmental shocks (Bowman, 2011) as well as allowing for the 
accumulation of funds to pursue new growth initiatives in future years (Bowman, Tuckman, & 
Young, 2010). Public charities such as the ones represented in the CN dataset may carry as large 
of a surplus as they like (Fremont-Smith, 2004).  
Unlike the CN ratings, this ratio is not adjusted for industry differences. Through the 
process of factor analysis, researchers have found that FP is conceptually and statistically distinct 
from other measures of organizational performance, such as fundraising efficiency or public 
support (Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003). Other studies of NFP performance have also used FP 
(Siciliano, 1996; 1997) because it provides a comparable measure of financial performance 
across NFPs beyond idiosyncratic performance measures.  
Control Variables 
This study includes relevant controls in order to limit the influence of potential 
confounds. As organizations age and grow, they tend to exhibit greater levels of structure, rather 
than flexibility (Sørensen & Stuart, 2000); hence, I have controlled for both of these possible 
confounding variables in order to limit their influence on the outcomes of this study. Firm age 
influences the impact of simultaneous and sequential ambidexterity on organizational 
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performance (Venkatraman et al., 2007). Organizational size has also been found to moderate the 
relationship between exploration and the development of new products (Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2004). Consistent with other strategic management research at the organizational level of 
analysis, organizational size is operationalized as the NFP’s net assets (Russo, 1992), taken from 
the fiscal year’s income statement. Each organization provides its founding date in the CN 
database, so organizational age is calculated as the number of years since the organization’s 
founding. CN reports data that span nine broad categories and thirty-four different causes, which 
essentially represent different “industries” within the NFP sector. Cost structures can vary widely 
across different categories and some categories may also be overrepresented within the database 
(charitynavigator.org), so I have controlled for the different industries in the CN dataset to 
prevent the likelihood of confounding noise across different segments and mission types.  
Validity 
 Validity refers to the establishment of evidence that a measure depicts the intended 
construct (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Although there are many types and conceptualizations of 
validity (Schriesheim, Cogliser, Scandura, Lankau, & Powers, 1999), two are of particular 
importance to the present study. First, content validity refers to the representativeness of the 
content contained in the instrument. The two independent variable measures—OC and OE—
closely relate to the two ambidexterity concepts proposed by March (1991): exploration and 
exploitation. Second, external construct validity refers to whether the findings from the sample 
are generalizable to a larger context (Messick, 1988). Based on the large sample size, which is 
more than five times greater than the next largest empirical ambidexterity study (Venkatraman et 
al., 2007) as well as the inclusion of all reported “industries” within the largest NFP rating 
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organization in the sector, it is likely that the results derived from this study will demonstrate a 
high degree of external construct validity, i.e., generalizability. The inclusion of a full correlation 
matrix (see Table 3) that depicts the strength of relationships between all variables within a study 
may also contribute to the evidence of validity (Crook, Shook, Morris, & Madden, 2010).  
Study 2 Methods and Context 
In order to address the second research question of this dissertation, “How do NPFs 
manage ambidextrous operations?” I selected four sites from the CN dataset of 108 possible food 
banks. All of the food banks are affiliates of the Feeding America national network and are 
located in the Southeast United States. I conducted site visits and semi-structured interviews with 
executive directors and other senior members of the leadership team. Three of the four food 
banks rate highly on both CN ratings for efficiency and capacity, which makes them an excellent 
research setting to begin to understand how these types of organizations are able to deliver their 
services efficiently while also seeking new programs, sources of funding, sources of food, and 
donors. The fourth is very high on exploitation and moderately high on exploration. Figure 4 
presents a scatter plot of the four food banks analyzed for this study and presents their relative 
positions in the 2x2 matrix of exploration and exploitation.  
The operational context for food banks has recently shifted in a dramatic way (Etter & 
Jargon, 2007). From the grass-roots beginnings of the first food banks in the 1970s, modern food 
banks are large, professionally-managed organizations responsible for covering every county in 
the United States. In 1979, the independent food banks created a national organization to handle 
fundraising, advocacy, and partnerships at the national level. This structure is different from a 
case of a headquarters spawning smaller local subsidiaries; rather, in this case, the local 
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subsidiaries decided to form a national headquarters. The mission-based operational focus of 
food banks suggests that they would have difficulty innovating beyond their core mission of 
providing food to hungry individuals. Food banks within this network are called affiliates and 
each food bank is given a service area consisting of a set number of counties. Affiliates are not 
permitted to solicit donations of food or money from donors outside their service area, nor are 
they able to expand their offerings into counties served by other affiliates in the network. As 
sources of food have shifted from large-scale corporate donations to purchased food, food banks 
have needed to find additional sources of food to distribute (Etter & Jargon, 2007). Food banks 
have also come to rely more heavily on private donations in the face of shrinking federal and 
state funding. All of these new demands require that food banks be resourceful in terms of 
finding new sources of healthy food and new donors to fund programs. These two needs—
purchasing more food on the open market and searching for new sources of funding—also come 
at a time when food banks and donors are looking beyond the raw number of pounds distributed 
to the community to determine the nutritional make-up of the food as well. Rising rates of 
childhood obesity and diabetes have pushed food banks to see themselves as a source of food as 
well as a source of good nutrition.  
The additional logistical issues of storing and distributing refrigerated foods such as milk 
and meat, along with fast-spoiling foods such as bread and vegetables, pose challenges for food 
banks. These warehouses have not always been equipped to deal with tractor-trailer loads of 
frozen food, deliveries of fruit that will spoil within days, or bread that must be handled and 
stored without being damaged. These changing dynamics are not yet reflected in the CN dataset 
since their description of the food banking industry states, “As primarily non-cash operations, 
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these charities demonstrate very little need for spending on overhead. Their median 
administrative expenses fall below the median for all of the charities we rate.” Furthermore, 
“Because the bulk of their expenses take the form of donated food and goods, these charities 
need only small amounts of working capital” (charitnavigator.org). To compensate for this 
deficiency in the quantitative data, I conducted site visits at four food banks to interview 
executive directors and other members of their leadership team to determine the mechanisms by 
which food banks are engaging in ambidextrous operations.  
Study 2 Data Collection 
Prior to conducting interviews with the food bank top managers, I submitted a request to 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) to obtain permission from the board to conduct interviews. 
Figure 5 shows the approval letter required to conduct human subjects research and Figure 6 
shows the informed consent sheet that each participant signed, indicating their willingness to 
participate in the present study and their right to end participation at any time.  
Following this approval process, I interviewed, at a minimum, the executive director for 
each of the four food banks selected for the study. Where possible, I also interviewed other 
members of the senior leadership teams, including CFOs and vice presidents. Interviews ranged 
from 30 to 60 minutes in length. Some interviews were conducted in office settings while others 
were conducted during walking tours of the food bank facilities. Interviews followed a semi-
structured format that began with probing questions about employees’ experience and 
background prior to becoming leaders in the food bank organization. Following these 
introductory questions, I asked about theoretically-relevant topics related to OA such as growth, 
change, organizational turning points, efficiency, and ratings agencies such as CN. I asked the 
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top managers to describe at least one successful growth initiative, one unsuccessful growth 
initiative, and how their organization interacts with other types of organizations. Figure 7 
presents the interview protocol used to guide the questions. To protect the identity of the 
respondents, the names and locations of the food banks have been altered: 
Central is regarded as the innovator of the group by other affiliates. Central serves the 
largest population of clients and they also have the deepest pockets. All three of the other 
executive directors were impressed by what the staff at Central has accomplished. Central’s FP is 
1.03.  
Riverside also moved from an urban location to a suburban location. Unlike many of the 
other food banks, they require individuals to come to the food bank in person to pick up food. 
Riverside’s FP is 1.03. 
Wright has exceeded warehouse capacity and their lack of available space is causing 
problems with efficiency. They are planning a move to a new space to accommodate the growing 
demand in their service area. Wright’s FP is 1.04. 
Orange recently completed a move to a larger warehouse. After outgrowing their 
previous space, they relocated to a corporate park in a different county from their previous 
location. Orange is the only food bank in the sample that is not fully located in Quadrant 4 of 
Figure 1. With exploration scores of 15.65 and exploitation scores of 36.68, Orange has similar 
CN ratings to the other three and the interviews at this site reflected themes similar to those 
described at the other sites. Due to this similarity, Orange remains included in the study. 
Orange’s FP is 0.99. 
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Following best practices set forth by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), all interviews 
were transcribed within 24 hours. I kept a notebook during the site visits in order to record my 
first impressions of the facilities, the people I met with, and other thoughts that were not captured 
by the digital audio recorder. Where possible, I requested permission to take pictures of the 
facilities and their operations. In addition to the audio recorder, I took notes throughout the 
interviews and site tours to record my impressions regarding what I was seeing and hearing from 
the NFP managers. All interviews were transcribed using a professional transcription service and 
checked within twenty-four hours of receipt of each transcription to ensure consistency and to fill 
in any words or gaps that the transcriptionist was unable to interpret from the audio recording. 
After all of the interviews were transcribed, they were entered into a text analysis 
program, QDA Miner (provalis.com), to facilitate the isolation and identification of common 
themes across the interviews. Each interview was coded for broad themes related to processes in 
place at the food banks that may contribute to ambidextrous operations and then re-analyzed to 
look for more detailed themes under each process. Because participants often discussed other 
issues that related tangentially to core ambidexterity concepts, I also looked for themes that were 
not expressly in the interview protocol that might offer new theoretical insight to the 
ambidexterity literature. The main themes that emerged are presented in the following chapter.  
Research Methods Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the present study, its analytical approaches, and 
the measures used to test the hypothesized relationships between the variables of interest for the 
quantitative portion of the dissertation. This chapter also described the procedure for receiving 
permission to conduct human subjects research, the sample of food banks used in the qualitative 
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portion, the interview and transcription process, and the method of analysis used to identify the 




Chapter 4 – Results 
Study 1: Organizational Ambidexterity and Financial Performance 
 
This chapter presents the quantitative results of this study. The STATA IC version 11 
statistics package was used for the mean-comparison ANOVA and clustered regression analysis. 
Hypothesis test results are reported in the following tables: Table 5 presents the results from the 
ANOVA test that compares the fiscal performance scores for organizations at high and low 
levels of exploration and exploitation. Table 6 presents the results of the clustered multiple 
regression that tests the overall impact of OA on fiscal performance from the overall CN dataset. 
Form 990 data reflects the operations of the organization itself; thus, the unit of analysis for this 
research project is the NFP. All of the NFPs in the dataset are “nested” within larger sectors, 
requiring clustered robust regression for hypothesis testing. Organizations within the same cause 
and category are likely to share other characteristics and clustered regression accounts for 
potential non-independence between organizations by employing robust standard errors. Rather 
than use sums of squares to estimate an overall F statistic for the model, clustered regression 
uses a Wald test to estimate an F statistic. For clustered regression, the r-squared statistic is 
equivalent to an adjusted r-squared statistic so only the r-squared statistic is reported in Table 6. 
Fiscal performance scores have been scaled up by a factor of 100 to facilitate interpretation of 
regression output as a percentage of deficit or surplus. 
A caveat of this study is that the quantitative results should be interpreted with caution. 
Despite calls in the NFP performance assessment literature to use measures that are comparable 
across organizations (Herman and Renz, 1998; Rojas, 2000), the use of IRS-reported financial 
indicators as proxies for the independent variables of this study—OC, OE, and OA—and the 
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dependent variable—FP—resulted in a high degree of multicollinearity between the predictor 
and outcome variables. In addition to the issue of multicollinearity, FP was not normally 
distributed across the CN sample. The combination of non-normality for the dependent variable 
as well as the multicollinearity between the financial variables suggests that although the results 
of the multiple regression analysis reported may provide some guidance for researchers and 
managers, the true relationships between the constructs of interest may vary from those presented 
here. Until additional NFP-appropriate measures are developed and widely adopted, it is likely 
that successful attempts to assess NFP activities and outcomes quantitatively will remain elusive 
(Sawhill and Williamson, 2001). 
Results of Hypothesis Tests 
The overall mean fiscal performance score for the CN dataset was 1.01, indicating that, 
on average, the organizations were operating at a slight (1%) surplus over their expenses. To test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, organizations were grouped into four quadrants based on the mean scores 
for exploration and exploitation. Table 5 presents the mean FP values per cell based on a mean 
split of exploration and exploitation, the number of NFPs per cell, the FP difference between 
each cell and the significance level of these differences. All four mean cell values for fiscal 
performance differed significantly (p < .05) from the overall mean of 1.01. Each of the cell 
means also differed significantly from each other (p < .05) with the exceptions of quadrants 3 
and 4, which were not significantly different from each other. This table forms the basis for 
testing hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1a’, H1b’, and H2. 
Consistent with the traditional concept of ambidexterity from the organizational learning 
literature (March, 1991), the following hypotheses were proposed to suggest that organizations 
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that attempt to simultaneously engage in high levels of both actions may be at a disadvantage 
relative to organizations that attempt to specialize in either exploration or exploitation. 
Hypothesis 1 offered the general hypothesis that focused organizations would outperform 
ambidextrous organizations, with more specific hypotheses for each condition.  
Hypothesis H1a suggests that exploitation-focused organizations will outperform 
ambidextrous organizations. Specifically:  
H1a: Exploitation-focused organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 2) 
will experience greater financial performance than organizations that 
attempt an ambidextrous strategy (Quadrant 4).  
Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e., quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08. This 
performance score is significantly different from the average FP of .95 reported by exploitation-
focused organizations (i.e., quadrant 2); thus, H1a is not supported.  
 Hypothesis H1b suggests that exploration-focused organizations will outperform 
ambidextrous organizations. Specifically:  
H1b: Exploration-focused organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 3) will 
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt 
an ambidextrous strategy (Quadrant 4).  
 Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e. quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08. 
This performance score is not significantly different from the average FP of 1.05 reported by 
exploration-focused organizations (i.e. quadrant 3); thus, H1b is not supported.  
50 
  
In addition to these hypotheses, two alternates were also proposed: H1’ suggested that 
ambidextrous organizations would outperform focused organizations. Specifically, H1a’ 
proposed: 
H1a’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will 
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt 
an exploitation focus (Quadrant 2). 
 Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e. quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08. 
This performance score is significantly higher than the average FP of .95 reported by 
exploitation-focused organizations (i.e. quadrant 3); thus, H1a’ is supported.  
Specifically, H1b’ also proposed:  
H1b’: Ambidextrous organizations within Figure 1 (Quadrant 4) will 
experience greater financial performance than organizations that attempt 
an exploration focus (Quadrant 3). 
 Table 5 illustrates that ambidextrous firms (i.e. quadrant 4) report an average FP of 1.08. 
This performance score is not significantly higher than the average FP of 1.05 reported by 
exploration-focused organizations (i.e. quadrant 3); thus, H1b’ is not supported.  
The second main hypothesis considered the case of NFPs that were rated as low on both 




H2: Organizations with equally low levels of exploration and exploitation 
(Quadrant 1) will experience the lowest financial performance.  
 Table 5 illustrates that firms with low exploration and exploitation scores (i.e. quadrant 
1) report an average FP of .90. This performance score is significantly lower than the average FP 
of the entire dataset (1.01), and is also significantly lower than the average FP of the other three 
quadrants; thus, H2 is supported.  
Finally, clustered regression was used to assess the overall impact of ambidextrous 
operations on fiscal performance and evaluate Hypothesis 3. 
H3: Organizational ambidexterity will have a significant, positive effect on 
financial performance.  
Table 6 presents the clustered regression output with robust standard errors. Prior to this 
test, all outliers were removed in order to eliminate their influence on the results. The sample 
size reported is reduced due to lack of data recorded data either of on the control variables, age 
or size, leaving the final sample for clustered regression analysis at 3,935 NFPs. From this test, 
the relationship between exploration and FP was significant, but exploitation was non-
significant. OA was also non-significantly related to FP, and the negative sign indicates that 
ambidexterity may actually be detrimental to FP. From these results, H3 was not supported.  
Robustness Checks 
To assess the robustness of these analysis from potential points of influence or outliers, I 
also conducted the ANOVA and regression analyses with all cases dropped that reported a zero 
(0) score for either exploration or exploitation, which would have yielded a zero (0) score for 
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ambidexterity. Dropping these seventy-four cases had no effect on the overall results in post-hoc 
checks, and did not change the degree of support for any of the hypotheses; consequently, these 
cases were included in the final analyses to leave the dataset intact.  
A second robustness check for the possible influence from cases with zeros with 
exploration or exploitation was to adjust these scores from 0 to 1 in order to minimize the impact 
of a zero for an ambidexterity score. After making these 74 adjustments, the ANOVA and 
regression analyses were repeated, but this change had no effect on the overall results, nor did it 
change the degree of support for any of the hypotheses.  
Industry-specific Results 
Although no specific hypotheses were offered regarding the impact of industry 
differences that may influence the relationship between OA and FP, a post-hoc ANCOVA test 
indicated significant differences based on the range of industries present in the CN dataset. The 
ANCOVA to ascertain the presence of between-group differences resulted in an overall model F 
of 6.14, indicating that levels of FP varied by industry and an adjusted r-squared of .05, 
indicating that OC, OE, OA, organizational age, and organizational size accounted for 
approximately 5% of the variance in FP. In addition to the ANCOVA test, a regression model 
with all 34 industries included as dummy variables was also evaluated. The first block of control 
variables (industry, organizational age, and organizational size) resulted in an adjusted r-squared 
of .02. The inclusion of OE, OC, and OA in a second block of variables increased the adjusted r-
squared for the full model to .05 for a change in r-squared of .03. Table 7 presents the OLS 
regression results for the six industries where exploration, exploitation, or ambidexterity have a 
significant impact on fiscal performance: animal rights, private elementary and secondary 
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schools, private universities, food banks, international development, and fundraising. These 
industries cover a broad swath of institutional missions, and it is especially puzzling that 
although ambidexterity has a significant positive effect on fiscal performance for one industry 
(private elementary schools), it actually has a negative impact on fiscal performance for the 
others. These findings will be discussed in detail in chapter five. These results provide some 
answers to the first research question; specifically, what is the impact of OA on organizational 
performance. A qualitative approach allows for insights into the underlying processes in use in a 
sample of ambidextrous organizations. The results from the qualitative portion of the dissertation 
follow.  
Study 2: Processes for Managing Ambidexterity 
Although the role of watchdog organizations was expected to be a major part of the 
discussion, most of the executive directors glossed over the topic. Rather than changing 
organizational goals and programs to maximize specific ratings from organizations such as CN, 
they were more interested in operating at their peak performance and allowing the ratings to fall 
where they may. When asked about whether or not the managers at the food bank are concerned 
about ratings from CN, the executive director from Orange remarked,  
“I don’t pay too much attention to it really. We are required to be 
audited every year, we are required to file a 990 every year, so we 
meet on those obligations and that is public data. So as long as we 
are doing our fiscal accountability they really don’t bother us much 
at all.”  
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The desire to earn high ratings from CN did not appear to be a catalyst for growth and 
efficiency, but the inductive analysis of the interviews revealed three main processes that enabled 
food banks to engage in exploration and exploitation as a way to remain competitive. All of the 
executive directors, and many of the vice presidents, indicated that the field had changed in a 
number of ways over the past decade. The executive director of Central commented,  
“Food banking was created to take that waste from food industry 
and make sure that it didn’t get thrown in the Dumpster and make 
sure that it fed hungry people.”  
From this shared beginning, all four of the executive directors noted that successful, 
modern food banks are now essentially operated as businesses. The executive director at Central 
remarked,  
“Non-profits have changed from being what we might call just a 
‘do-gooder’ organization in that they have to run it just like any 
other business because you have to have a cash reserve in order to 
be able to continue funding your program during the good years 
and the bad years. Having a cash reserve or having a cash surplus 
at year-end is a positive thing and that’s where foundations are 
looking.” 
Likewise, one of the vice presidents at Wright commented,  
“I would say food banking [has] become a pretty fine-tuned 
business kind of operation” 
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The managers in this study all anticipated the need for organizational change before the 
changing situation became a major crisis. Although all of the executive directors described a 
dynamic environment characterized by declining support, none indicated that this would present 
a challenge that could result in the dissolution of their food bank or network. By proactively 
developing responses to changing situations, executive directors have been able to stay ahead of 
the curve, even when that has led to decisions that may be locally unpopular. The executive 
director of Orange remarked,  
“When we announced we were moving to [this county], people 
thought we were leaving them. But we had to move if we wanted 
to keep doing what we were doing without changing our mission.”  
By moving to a larger space with the capacity for refrigerated storage, the food bank was 
able to adapt to changing demand patterns and calls for increased nutritional requirements 
without having to sacrifice its ability to meet the needs of its recipients. 
The ability to balance the tension inherent in exploration and exploitation appears to have 
come from three main processes: managing knowledge, retaining professional talent, and 
enabling leadership. Each of the executive directors talked about all three processes in use at 
their food bank. The unique finding from this inductive study is that food banks used the same 
three processes simultaneously to explore for new programs and funding sources, as well as to 
exploit existing resources for program refinements. Table 8 provides examples of the different 
processes and quotes to illustrate how each process allowed the food banks to operate 
ambidextrously within their local community and across a larger national network. Executive 




The first process that emerged from analyzing the interviews was the collaborative nature 
of affiliates within the network. They shared ideas for new projects and refinements to existing 
projects through two major channels: an annual conference organized by Feeding America and 
ongoing interactions with staff and executive directors at other affiliates. Each of these two 
processes, knowledge coordinated through national meetings and knowledge shared through 
networks of local affiliates, permitted food banks to more effectively explore for new programs 
and exploit existing programs and facilitated ambidextrous operations.  
Coordinating Best Practices 
The four food bank sites in this study are affiliates of the Feeding America network. In 
exchange for annual dues of $6,000, each affiliate is able to access the resources and connections 
at the national headquarters. One of the main resources the executive directors described is an 
annual conference organized by the Feeding America headquarters. At this meeting, food banks 
are presented with awards based on their performance and innovative new strategies for meeting 
Feeding America’s mission are showcased. The executive director of Riverside described:  
“You know you go to conferences, they highlight something and 
you think, ‘Well that might work for us’ and you bring it back.” 
 Some of these innovative programs start from distant sites, such as New Mexico, and 
through the national network end up making into the local service area for food banks. As the 
executive director at Orange explained, 
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“I said to the board, ‘You know that backpack program's working 
in New Mexico and we have five thousand dollars in [this county]. 
Would you give me permission to try the backpack program in 
[this county] and if it doesn't work, it won't?’”  
From this beginning as an innovative new program for Orange, they were able to take the 
backpack program, refine it locally, and eventually be recognized by the Feeding America 
headquarters as a food bank with a backpack program worth emulating. The executive director of 
Orange described their role as an identified success story at the national conference for other 
managers: 
“Our network has Food Bank of the Year awards and recognitions 
so we all apply. Now we’re recognized for our backpack program 
because we are the third largest backpack program in the country.” 
 In this case, the national meeting provides new ideas for programs and facilitates the 
cross-pollination of best practices between different food banks. For Orange, the children’s 
backpack program was started after hearing about its use in New Mexico. The executive director 
brought the idea back to her affiliate, asked for funding from the board, and began replicating the 
program locally. Once the Feeding America headquarters identifies exemplary affiliates, they 
may ask them to mentor other food banks as a way to help a novice affiliate quickly learn how to 
operate a new program without having to start with a completely blank slate. The executive 
director at Orange will work with a manager from another affiliate to teach them how to start up 
a successful backpack program:  
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So Chicago just contacted us, “Will you mentor a new food bank 
employee that’s running their backpack program?” 
Because of this national coordination, innovative programs and best practices are 
distributed through the network and executive directors can learn from the most effective 
programs in the country. The opportunity to explore for new programs and exploit best practices 
from other food banks is one of the major advantages of the network. In addition to learning 
from the national network of affiliates, executive directors also talked about engaging with 
affiliates who were geographically closer. This proximity makes it easier to travel between sites 
to exchange ideas and cross-train employees. The second theme of managing knowledge relates 
to interactions with these more proximate food banks.  
Leveraging Local Relationships 
 Although the national meeting and other conferences are opportunities to identify 
innovative new programs being tested across the network, another type of knowledge exchange 
happens between proximal affiliates as programs are refined. The vice president of operations at 
Central came from a for-profit company within the automotive industry and expressed his 
surprise at how easy it was to communicate with other affiliates about ongoing process 
refinements and benchmarking:  
“There’s a lot more knowledge sharing in this group. I just don’t 
remember calling up another plant manager at another automotive 
company to say, ‘Hey, can I come over and look at your facility?’ 
The benchmarking wasn’t as easy in those industries.” 
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In addition to visiting different sites to see how different affiliates conduct their 
operations, the vice president of operations at Central also had standing meetings on the third 
Wednesday of every month with six other food banking operations managers in order to compare 
notes. At this same site, the executive director of Central said:  
“I call all my coworkers, and my other directors and say ‘I am 
going to have an issue with this and I am not really sure how I 
should do it’ and ‘can I bounce this off of you and will you give 
me some feedback’, or ‘I heard you are doing this could you send 
me your job description on that? I would love that so I don’t have 
to recreate the wheel.”  
 These collaborative relationships with other local executive directors and managers 
within the network of affiliates helped to lower the risks associated with new programs and to 
increase the efficiency of day-to-day operations because the managers were able to work from 
pre-existing routines that other affiliates had already refined. In addition to communication 
between the top managers, the executive director of Orange described the process for socializing 
new hires into the food bank’s mission and procedures by sending staff to different affiliates.  
“That’s the best thing about the network. When we get new 
employees we send them to another [affiliate] just to see how they 
do it.”  
 This system facilitates knowledge sharing and the informal contacts necessary for 
effective exploratory behavior. The executive director at Wright also mentioned how an 
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innovative piece of machinery increased the food bank’s efficiency by reducing the rate of 
discarded cans from 60% to 20%, but remarked: “We didn’t develop this. This is in another best 
practice from another food bank.” By exchanging staff and ideas at the local level, the executive 
directors are able to refine their ongoing operations. These two means of knowledge exchange, 
national conferences and local interactions, both act as a source of new information for food 
bank managers. As a method for managing ambidextrous operations, innovative new programs 
are highlighted at the national conference, and existing programs are refined through contact 
with other local or regional affiliates. Table 9 presents additional quotes related to managing 
knowledge to facilitate exploratory and exploitive actions in the food banks. These two 
complementary processes allow the food banks to promote their unique innovations on a national 
scale while simultaneously learning from other local affiliates in order to minimize the time and 
effort spent inventing new programs and reducing the likelihood of failure. In addition to 
managing knowledge, a second process that emerged from the interviews was that of retaining 
talent. Directors and other interviewees alluded to this concept in terms of two sub-processes: 
hiring professional management and outsourcing non-core routines.  
Retaining Talent 
Exploitation leads to consistent returns from process refinements that result from the 
reduced costs associated with repeated routines. Because CN considers management and 
executive compensation as a negative factor when calculating ratings for efficiency, I asked 
about maximizing the use of volunteers to minimize salary and overhead expenses. The vice 
president at Wright responded, “There are some of our charities that we serve that operate like 
that (i.e. all volunteer labor), but not for very long.” Although the executive directors expressed 
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their gratitude to their dedicated volunteers, they all agreed that their organizations were too 
large and complex to operate without specialized full-time management, which lead to the first 
sub-process related to retaining talent: hiring professional management. The executive director of 
Central described the changing face of food bank managers:  
“When I started my career back in 60’s and 70’s, any kind of non-
profit or social work job was done by a woman because it didn’t 
pay enough for a man to get involved in unless they got in at the 
administrative level. So back then if you did a survey of who ran 
nonprofits and how long they ran them, they were all women and 
they were all social workers … If I was graduating from college 
today, I wouldn’t get a degree in social work. I would get a degree 
in business or marketing. Then I would probably get an MBA of 
some sort, maybe a law degree.” 
This sentiment is reflected by the other managers who have seen the industry change 
dramatically from its grass-roots beginnings. The vice president of operations at Central 
remarked:  
“This organization is starting to get so big that it’s you know, it 
needs to run more like a corporation. It needs to have more of a 
mindset of, ‘We need to look at everything that we invest our 
money in and our time in to make sure that we’re going to be good 
stewards of our resources and our donors’ money and our donors’ 
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food and we’re doing the right thing with it.’ So it’s not as 
grassroots as it was.” 
The changing dynamics of the food banking industry have influenced the types of 
managers best suited to operate in this environment. Rather than the social workers described by 
the executive director of Central, the focus on efficiency, accountability, and reporting 
necessitates managers whose skills have been honed in formal bureaucracies can be transferred 
to a NFP context.  
Hiring Professional Management 
This description of the type of managers who would typically be found in a food bank 
twenty or thirty years ago stands in sharp contrast to the professional managers found in today’s 
food banks. Food banks have become so much larger in terms of their complexity, staffing, and 
number of programs, that they now draw from backgrounds in the management of for-profit 
businesses, the military, and academia. The executive director of Central described the benefits 
of managers with these types of skill sets:  
“I’ll never forget when a gentleman went to work as the CEO of 
the food bank in Chicago and he was a one-star General that came 
out of the Marine Corps. I wondered what does a one-star General 
know about food banking? Well, you know what? You have to 
know how to work with people and you got to know how to assess 
and how to measure outcomes and all those things.”  
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The vice president of operations at Central explained how the introduction of 
engineering, military, and professional managers played a role in influencing the growing culture 
of efficiency at Central and a reduction in non-routinized practices:  
“You got some push back for awhile and you had some turnover 
and had some few folks that didn’t really like the way that uh that I 
managed and you know, because it was. It was really very ‘fly by 
the seat of our pants’ out here. You know, running around with 
hair on fire every day. I don’t like doing that. I keep going back to, 
“You know what? It’s not our money.” We are helping people and 
if we can do it safer and we’re protecting with our quality of food 
and we’re doing it, we’re protecting our donors’ money and our 
donors’ resources by doing it more efficiently, then that is helping 
people which is our mission.” 
Incorporating managers from the for-profit world allowed food banks to begin to tap into 
new skill sets that improved both exploration and exploitation. Former marketers and salespeople 
became externally-focused vice presidents for community relations, and managers with logistics, 
engineering, or operations experience became internally-focused vice presidents of operations, 
overseeing the efficient storage and distribution of food within a large, fast-moving warehouse 
environment. The purposeful inclusion of these professionals allows each executive director to 
take advantage of new ideas and refinements. The vice president of operations at Central 
described the impact that his presence has had on the day-to-day warehouse operations:  
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“The big dips and the peaks and valleys are leveled out a little bit 
more. So that was a big kind of a paradigm shift here. It was just 
like, “Look there’s a lot of things that we think we can’t control 
here that we actually can if we just put some process and procedure 
in place.” And we’ve been working really hard at that for the last 
six to eight months, really trying to implement a lot of those 
processes and procedures and standardize things as much as we 
can.  
In addition to improving exploitive processes in the warehouse through ongoing 
refinement, the addition of an on-staff professional chef at Central allowed the food bank to build 
a demonstration kitchen to engage in a variety of exploratory strategies for community 
awareness. Central is located in a large corporate park with few alternates for meals during the 
day, so they open to the public for lunch two days per week. They also host a cooking camp for 
teens in the summer, and provide space for other organizations to hold meetings and events. This 
exploratory approach to community outreach developed as a direct result of the executive chef 
and the executive director.  
Another result of this influx of skill sets and expertise is an environment that became 
progressively more professionalized, with each group of managers focusing on either exploration 
or exploitation strategies. This account from the vice president of community relations at Wright 
describes the need for a more standardized approach to grants:  
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“I remember one turning point was a grant that I helped work on 
for Kraft. When Kraft Foods got really involved with food 
banking, I still remember seeing their grant. They wanted a 
business plan more or less. You know, they really wanted us to lay 
out well, ‘Who are you going to get the food from? How much is it 
going to cost you to transport it?’ You know, at that point we had 
been factoring in those kinds of things with programs, but they 
really took it to the next level as far as being very exact on what 
we were going to do with the money and you know, and how um 
our plan.” 
 By bringing in more professional talent to explore for new programs as well improve 
efficiencies in existing programs, food banks were able to attract more grants from large, for-
profit companies such as Kraft that wanted to see a professionally-managed food bank receiving 
their donated money and products. The only way to present this level of professionalism to large 
corporate donors was through the use of skilled managers, and hiring and retaining skilled 
managers required offering market-level compensation in order to stay with the food banks. The 
executive director of Riverside described having to pay market wages to attract and retain 
talented people. 
“You can’t operate with all volunteers. Nothing like this. You have 
to have the best that you can afford and that’s always been rough 
on us. You get the best, you pay as much as you can, and you get 
the best that you can get for that. And if you are competitive it 
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comes back to good staff and people. You don’t want to train 
people and have them jumping ship to go someplace where they 
can make a lot more money. So you either provide benefits, make 
the pay equitable, or other intrinsic things that people appreciate. 
We can’t have people working here who are below the poverty 
level themselves. That’s a goal that we need to adhere to.” 
 This concept of minimizing turnover came through in interviews as a much stronger 
desire than minimizing labor costs. Directors and executive directors were committed to keeping 
these managers employed with the food bank so that they could develop the experience and 
connections needed to help the food bank succeed. The executive director of Orange explained 
that their food bank had not previously paid a competitive salary and kept losing talented people 
until she went to the board to ask for more money for staff salaries:  
“So my first five to seven years of not doing a very good job of 
managing was getting the right people on the bus. You couldn’t 
pay the people to do the job you needed them to do so of course, 
they’d leave the minute they got a better job. So after about five 
years of watching that occur, I said [to the board] ‘Okay, if you 
guys let me pay this person this much per year, if we’re not going 




This process of hiring people, only to quickly lose them to higher-paying jobs elsewhere, 
worked counter to the food bank’s goals, but actually yielded favorable ratings from CN for a 
high rate of efficiency in terms of administrative expenses. Although the food bank managers 
said that business-savvy donors understand the concept of paying for talent, “Kraft and some of 
these bigger companies realize that we can’t feed 38,000 people a month without the staff 
support” (vice president, Wright), some of the smaller donors did not see this as a worthwhile 
expenditure of organizational funds. The executive director at Central remarked,  
“I don’t think it’s a hard sell to [business leaders], but it is a hard 
sell to the person that gives me five dollars a year and says, ‘I can’t 
believe they are paying you that much money. I can’t believe that 
you have this many staff.’”  
Likewise, the executive director of Orange said,  
“When some people think you’re working for a non-profit, you 
should be making thirty grand a year and love every minute of it 
because you’re helping the needy. If I don’t pay my quality people 
what they would make on the market, they’re not going to stay 
here. I mean, everybody wants to help a hungry person, but they 
also want to feed their children too.” 
Despite this trend towards more professional managers, some functions remain outside 
the scope of what the food bank can most efficiently execute with their current staff, leading to 
the second sub-process related to retaining talent: outsourcing non-core activities.  
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Outsourcing Non-Core Activities 
Executive directors were also outsourcing non-core activities to other organizations in 
order to free up in-house employees for other tasks and to raise funds more efficiently with 
professional fundraising organizations. In each interview, the top managers mentioned that fund-
raising specialists were able to generate donations more efficiently than the food banks 
themselves were. Consequently, all four food banks had turned to professional fundraisers to 
bring in revenue, as described by the executive director of Riverside:  
 “We use outside fundraisers for direct mail, which has been very 
beneficial. If we didn’t do that we would not be able to keep the 
doors open. It was a hard sell when we first started it because the 
cost is considerable. It is about twenty-five percent of what you 
bring in and a lot of it’s up front so that was a hard thing to sell to 
the board, but we have been doing it for five years now and it’s 
proven to be a success.” 
The executive director at Orange also described transitioning from 
fundraising in-house to using an outside organization to handle direct mail: 
“We now hire a direct mail company in Boston that does our direct 
mail. Back when I started, we were writing our own letters and this 
is the whole food bank world. We all started with maybe four 
people and $300,000 budgets and handwriting letters to people. It 
costs us a ton. It’s totally efficient and they’re very astute in how 
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they write it. They know how to get that dollar. So it’s a no-
brainer.”  
Beyond direct mail for marketing and fundraising, the executive director of Central also 
described using an outside firm for personnel until the need became great enough to hire a full-
time employee: 
“We have used outside consultants in personnel until we grew to 
be larger and now we have hired that person who was on contract 
and they are now full-time staff. So I think that if you just look and 
see what’s new and who can do it better and maybe at a much 
more reasonable cost. I don’t think that we always have to have 
everything in-house.” 
 This newfound level of professionalism made food bank managers more willing to look 
beyond the boundaries of the organization for both exploratory needs (personnel consulting) or 
exploitative needs (efficient fundraising). This minimization of non-core processes increases 
efficiencies by relying on the unique expertise that professional fundraisers have and allows the 
full-time staff to focus on exploring for new programs and services. Table 10 presents additional 
quotes related to the ways that retaining talent facilitated exploratory and exploitive actions in 
the food banks. By identifying the non-core processes that could be offloaded to another 
organization, the food banks keep their professional, mission-focused staff engaged in the day-
to-day work of food banking, rather than shifting them to monotonous tasks such as addressing 




The third major process described in the interviews dealt with the concept of leadership, 
specifically a hands-off approach to encouraging experimentation within the organization. The 
interviewees described this leadership style as a function of both the top managers internal to the 
food bank as well as the leadership from the national Feeding America headquarters. The first 
leadership sub-process, headquarters coordination, facilitated ambidextrous operations by 
exposing distant food banks to innovative new ideas as well as efficient best practices that had 
already been refined. 
Facilitating Connections Nationally 
 From their early days as food pantries serving a small radius of local communities, food 
banking operations have become increasingly more structured as a function of the national 
Feeding America network that was originally created to improve efficiencies. Since then, 
Feeding America has taken on other roles as well, as described by one of the vice presidents at 
Central:  
“Food banks have been around since the late 70s into the 80s and 
then Feeding America started in the 90s. They do a lot of our 
national marketing. So they have really pulled our resources 
together which has been very good.” 
Although Feeding America operates as a national network with one headquarters in 
Chicago, the executive director of Central explains that there are differences between their 
network and other large NFPs:  
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“Our food bank network was or is different than, say the Red Cross 
or the Girl Scouts or Boy Scouts, which based it on a national level 
and then came down. It’s a much different format and structure. 
We started at a grass-roots level and came up. After we all started 
to rise across the country, we realized that we needed a national 
platform in which to carry our message, or advocacy for food 
donations or fund raising or marketing. So that’s really helped.” 
From this grass-roots start in the 1970s, food banks have become a large, cooperative 
network of affiliates, first under the Second Harvest brand, and more recently under the Feeding 
America brand. The executive director at Wright describes how Feeding America has facilitated 
the growth of affiliated food banks.  
“We are very blessed to have a national organization that gives us 
best practices that really guides us in the strategic planning 
process, that you know, we have a contract with them so we have 
some guidance and some road map to stay, you know, to not stay 
where we are but to go to the next level from where we were in 
1986 to maybe 1992, we were in that grass-roots organization 
stage and then get to a larger organization.” 
 Beyond providing a “road map” for growth, the national headquarters also facilitates 
donations of food and funding from large donors who may be otherwise hesitant to donate food 
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to a local food bank that lacks the backing of a national organization. According to the executive 
director of Central,  
“On a national level, what they do is they solicit all the large food 
companies and get mega truck loads of products that we could 
never access and get. In addition to that, they advocate on a 
national level in Washington, D.C. at all for federal nutrition 
programs … to ensure that we are going to have access to those 
kinds of items. We can’t do that at a local level. It would take too 
much energy and too much money to do that.” 
This network provides a variety of opportunities and connections for the affiliated food 
banks but does not directly intervene in day-to-day food bank operations. Each affiliate is given a 
set service area consisting of a number of counties and one of the conditions of membership in 
the network is that affiliates are not allowed to solicit donations of money or food outside their 
service area. Although Feeding America sets some standards and channels resources to the 
affiliates, all of the executive directors commented that Feeding America provides the affiliates 
with a great deal of freedom to operate their programs as they see fit. The executive director of 
Riverside explained the relationship between the food banks and the headquarters in the 
following terms:  
“They don’t tell us what to do and how to do it, but they monitor 
our storage practices. We have a contract. And as long as we are 
within that contract, you know, we are good. They will come every 
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other year and visit us and see how we keep our warehouse and all 
our inventories. They raise funds on a national level. They will 
allocate those around the network. They raise food on a national 
level with a lot of national donors and they will allocate that 
around.” 
The legitimacy of working with a Chicago-based national organization facilitated 
partnerships between local affiliates and branches of other national organizations in their 
immediate area. The executive director of Orange explained how having a national organization 
with its own board of directors benefitted the local affiliates by providing a venue for major for-
profit partners to contribute to ending hunger. She also explained how the headquarters was able 
to increase the visibility and legitimacy of ending hunger in America by involving executives 
from major for-profit businesses as Directors.  
“They’ve got Kraft’s president on their board and ConAgra’s 
president on their board. American Airlines’ president is on their 
board. They’re in Chicago and it’s a national organization and they 
feed people, so a lot of people want to be affiliated with that. And 
so we gain from that in a major way.” 
In addition to the connections brokered at the national level to improve exploration and 
exploitation, the local leadership also approached their role with an eye towards encouraging 
innovation from their managers. Encouraging experimentation at the local level provided a 
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steady stream of innovative ideas and efficient refinements for the food bank as well as the other 
affiliates in the network.  
Encouraging Experimentation Locally 
Although the Feeding America headquarters plays two roles by facilitating the spread of 
new ideas and the spread of best practices between affiliates, the local executive directors also 
fostered a culture of experimentation, as this quote from the Executive Chef at Central describes:  
“[The executive director] is probably one of the greatest 
visionaries. She surrounds herself with creative and innovative 
people and then lets them do their thing. But there [are] always 
parameters and as long you operate within the parameters, she 
allows you to make mistakes.” 
This type of enabling leadership style may be a result of the hands-off management from 
the Feeding America headquarters, but the interviewees described a culture of experimentation 
where new ideas for continuous improvement were championed by the executive director. The 
Vice President of Operations at Central described the process by saying,  
 “We capitalized on getting smart people that were in for-profit 
worlds and bringing them over to non-profit and just setting them 
loose and saying, ‘If you’ve got an idea and it is going to be able to 
bring revenue into the food bank and help us feed more people 
inside our service area, then let’s do it. Let’s try it.’” 
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 This desire to create innovative ideas resulted in a number of idiosyncratic programs that 
were started at one food bank and subsequently copied by others. Programs were developed 
based on specific local needs, unique opportunities, or even particular geographic endowments, 
such as the natural environment that permitted a community garden at Riverside. From its 
inception as an urban food bank, Riverside had a community garden staffed by area senior 
citizens. When the food bank outgrew its original site and moved to a more suburban location, 
they kept the concept of the community garden and placed a small agricultural area in their back 
yard, complete with potting sheds, greenhouses, a water cistern, and raised vegetable beds. The 
executive director at Riverside explained:  
“There are seven programs. The garden is one that we started. We 
teach a lot of classes on gardening and farming and rain barrels and 
maintenance and all sorts of environmental things. When we built 
this building, we had some land available, and we knew we wanted 
to put up a garden here. This is a teaching garden as well as a 
growing garden. The teaching part of it was just a way to sustain it 
and you know we charge for the classes and it brings money into 
the program and covers supplies and plants.” 
Master gardeners volunteer to staff this program and the garden provides fresh vegetables 
for the food bank, making the community garden a more efficient source of nutritious food than 
waiting to receive donations of expired perishable goods of questionable quality from nearby 
grocery stores. Because of the linkages between the other affiliates, as well as the relationship 
with the national headquarters, programs such as this one, which are developed at a single food 
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bank, can be recognized by the headquarters for its innovative method of efficiently producing 
fresh food without reliance on donors. Once this program has been sufficiently refined, it can be 
replicated at other food banks across the country through the knowledge sharing networks. Table 
11 presents additional quotes related to the enabling leadership style that facilitated exploratory 
and exploitive actions in the food banks. 
 These two sub-processes, facilitating connections and encouraging experimentation, are 
both ways that the food banks were able to explore for new opportunities and then successfully 
exploit their own knowledge. The connections forged at the national level brought in new 
resources for the food banks in the form of monetary donations, food, new trucks, and lasting 
partnerships with other national food producers and retailers. The national headquarters also 
maintained standards for storage practices to make sure that food banks were operating in a safe, 
efficient manner. At the local level, a culture of encouraging experimentation allowed the 
professional managers the latitude to experiment and implement new ideas. The top managers 
and boards of directors were, on the whole, receptive to new ideas and allowed other employees 
to contribute their innovative ideas for exploration and exploitation.  
Combining these three processes—managing knowledge, retaining talent, and enabling 
leadership—presents a narrative of an industry undergoing major transformation as sources of 
donated food dwindle and government funding shrinks at the same time that needs for services 
grow. In response to these changes, the food banks have developed an efficient system of 
knowledge management by using the national meetings to explore for new ideas and leveraging 
local network connections to refine ideas for greater efficiencies. These food banks look beyond 
the traditional social work background to bring in leaders with military, operations, or for-profit 
77 
  
business experience and then socialize these new entrants into the industry through repeated 
interactions with other affiliates. From their prior experience, managers with functional 
backgrounds in marketing and sales may develop innovative new programs to meet growing 
needs while managers with experience in operations or logistics may turn their expertise to 
improving the efficiency of operations so that productivity gains can be reinvested into the 
mission’s programs. The enabling leadership style from the national headquarters presents 
opportunities for best practices and connections to new sources of revenue, while a culture of 
experimentation at the local level provides a source for new ideas to spread throughout the 
network. As the executive directors have a better understanding of the unique skills and abilities 
that their staff bring to the food bank, they also understand that the best way to maximize these 
talents is by giving staff enough leeway to operate. Whether an individual’s skills lie on the 
exploration side (e.g., marketing, sales, community outreach) or the exploitation side (e.g., 
operations, warehousing, logistics), these executive directors have found that the best results 
occur from managerial autonomy rather than bureaucratic, top-down direction.  
The output of this model is the creation and recombination of ideas to develop and refine 
new programs: Idiosyncratic programs develop based on the specialized local knowledge at each 
affiliate. These novel programs range from the culinary arts center at Central, the award-winning 
backpack program for children’s nutrition at Orange, or the year-round community garden for 
teaching and supplying fresh vegetables to the food bank at Riverside. Any of these local 
innovations are ripe for transplantation to other sites within the network and Feeding America 
facilitates the cross-pollination of ideas by organizing the national conference. This cycle of 
exploration at the local level, followed by dissemination at the national level, and then 
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subsequent exploitation and refinement at the local level again, results in an ongoing process of 
ambidextrous operations. The main contribution of the network of affiliates is the feedback loop 
that emerges as top managers and other staff members communicate with each other to discover 
new programs and ways to operate existing programs more efficiently. Through these learning 
loops, individual food banks harness the collective power of the network to take on new ideas for 
efficient growth and to contribute their own ideas into the network for replication and 
amplification (Plowman et al., 2007). Individually, each of these concepts—professionalization, 
knowledge exchange, and leadership—all influence the food bank’s ability to operate 
ambidextrously. Together, they create a coherent narrative of different ways that local food 
banks are importing new knowledge and skills into their network from other industries and then 
using the power of the Feeding America to influence exploration and exploitation.  
79 
  
Chapter 5 – Discussion 
Discussion of Quantitative Results 
As previously mentioned in the results chapter, there are a number of caveats associated 
with interpreting the quantitative findings of this stud; however, despite these challenges, the 
quantitative portion of this study makes three main contributions. First, it extends the research 
begun by Szper and Prakash, (2011) and Seo and colleagues (2009) by analyzing the entire CN 
dataset. Previous studies that have looked only at single industries or state-wide service areas are 
inherently limited in their generalizability to other contexts. Because the entire CN dataset is not 
easy to download in its entirety, undertaking multi-industry studies such as this one become 
more complicated. This study shows the utility of novel data collection tools such as Visual Web 
Ripper to organizational research. Without the ability to download a single dataset that had been 
pre-packaged for analysis, manually gathering the 5,450 CN records into a spreadsheet for 
analysis would have taken a considerable amount of time and would likely contain more errors 
than the automated retrieval from Visual Web Ripper. Removing the hurdle of needing pre-
existing datasets in order to conduct large-scale research of secondary data means that 
researchers may find themselves asking new questions that previously would have been 
considered unanswerable without an existing data source. This type of data collection tool has 
utility beyond this project and can be leveraged in a variety of different data collection projects 
to gather data that may not otherwise exist in a pre-existing spreadsheet format.  
Second, this study highlights a number of questions about the nature of specific industry 
effects related to OA. The fact that so many of the industries from the CN dataset did not yield 
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significant results for either exploration or exploitation on fiscal performance suggests that 
different industry structures may contain more subtle differences than initially thought. Many of 
the industries from Table 1 are in creative or high-tech industries such as robotics (Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002), biotechnology (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), electronics (Atuahene-Gima, 2005) 
and product design (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Finding organizations that are actively 
exploring for new products and markets and also refining existing competencies may be easier to 
do in industries like these than in NFPs, which may be more conservative in terms of growth 
goals. Across the 33 industries of the CN dataset, this study was unable to replicate the 
overwhelmingly positive impact of ambidexterity on organizational performance reported in 
Table 1. Possible reasons for this outcome are discussed in greater detail in the limitations 
section of this study.  
Third, this study offers three possible explanations for why NFPs may differ from their 
for-profit counterparts in terms of their ability to pursue ambidexterity across a variety of 
industries. The first possibility is that NFPs are qualitatively different from their for-profit 
counterparts. Despite the fact that they face similar constraints to for-profit firms, it is possible 
that the theoretical underpinnings of OA are too deeply grounded in the for-profit sector and do 
not translate to an NFP context that focuses on high levels of efficiency and a narrow mission. A 
second possible reason for this finding could come from the proxies used to measure exploration 
and exploitation. Although they claim to measure organizational growth and efficiency, if the 
CN ratings are actually poor measures for assessing exploration and exploitation in 
organizational research, they are likely to report skewed results. Finally, the multi-industry 
nature of this study may highlight a file-drawer problem present in much of organizational 
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research (Rosenthal, 1979). The preponderance of studies in Table 1 reporting positive impacts 
of ambidextrous operations on organizational outcomes may simply be a selection bias in the 
publishing process, such that studies with negative or non-significant findings are less likely to 
be published.  
Despite these contributions, the use of the datasets such as CN is ill-equipped to answer 
this study’s second research question: specifically, how NFPs are engaging in ambidextrous 
behavior and the underlying processes. The following section describes and discusses the 
findings from the qualitative portion of this study.  
Discussion of Qualitative Results 
The qualitative portion of this study illuminates processes undertaken by a sample of 
food banks as they pursue the efficient delivery of the services their mission demands while 
simultaneously seeking new growth initiatives for diverse projects such as equipment purchases, 
the development of new programs to reach more clients, and capital campaigns to fund new 
building projects. The processes of managing knowledge, retaining talent, and enabling 
leadership allow the food banks to operate ambidextrously and the findings from this study have 
the potential to speak to other organizational theories that may explain some of the motivations 
for these processes.  
Managing Knowledge: Headquarters and Subsidiary Relationships 
The concept of strategic stickiness (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006) assumes 
that NFPs are constrained in their ability to explore new options by their founding missions that 
dictate the type of strategic options that NFPs may pursue. In addition to the inability to deviate 
82 
  
substantially from their mission, the food banks in this study are also geographically constrained 
by nature of their service area. Each food bank has a particular territory of counties to serve and 
is unable to solicit donors outside this service area. Despite these constraints of geography and 
mission scope, the food banks found many ways to develop new programs that meet their stated 
mission and to share these new initiatives with other affiliates.  
The top managers of each food bank leverage their connections with other network 
affiliates to maximize opportunities for exploration and exploitation. Exploration derives from 
large meetings such as the national conference where executive directors and other managers get 
exposure to best-in-class innovations and improvements made by food banks all over the 
country. As a result, affiliates are able to tap the best practices of other partners within the 
network to identify possible opportunities for new programs. In this regard, network affiliates are 
acting in the capacity of subsidiaries of the headquarters in Chicago, and like their for-profit 
counterparts, the creation of new knowledge, innovation, and competitive advantage has become 
a collective effort across the entire network (Birkinshaw, Hood, & Jonsson, 1998).  
Although the headquarters is assumed to control most of the firm-specific knowledge and 
advantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992), subsidiaries can contribute local innovations to the rest 
of the organization (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). When subsidiaries develop their own initiatives, 
it is a result of identifying opportunities and committing resources to that opportunity 
(Birkinshaw, 1997). The development of the first mobile food pantry perfectly illustrates this 
concept. In this example, the Grand Rapids food bank committed excess equipment (i.e., an 
unused truck) to an unmet opportunity that they saw in needing to distribute food quickly before 
it would be discarded. Following the development of this initiative, other affiliates were able to 
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exploit their membership in the Feeding America network to attend the national meeting and 
learn more about the mobile pantry initiative in Grand Rapids.  
With exposure to new ideas, other managers can begin to adapt these initiatives for their 
local service areas. In addition to meetings, local affiliates also exploit the research and 
connections that the headquarters develops at the national level. The food banks are unable to 
serve populations or solicit donations from beyond their service area; ideas must be adopted by 
other food banks in order to take root in other locations. Managers are also unable to execute 
their own strategy in other territories; rather, they must demonstrate its utility in their own 
territory in order for it to spread to other territories. The national conference is one way to gain 
large-scale exposure to ideas that begin in distant territories.  
A second way that knowledge moves through the food bank network is between other 
network affiliates without coordination from the national headquarters. Executive directors and 
other senior leaders of different affiliates suggested a number of reasons for this system 
including the hands-off approach to strategic direction from the headquarters in Chicago. 
Because the creation of the national headquarters was a comparatively recent event in the history 
of the food banking network, the food banks retained a great deal of autonomy at the local level, 
including which services they would or would not provide. This dynamic of informal 
communication between different executive directors reflects their level of connectedness 
(Jansen et al., 2006) and influences the refinement of ideas currently in use at local affiliates. In 
addition to communication between executive directors, affiliates also expose their employees to 
different sites within the network to facilitate the flow of program refinements between affiliates. 
By physically going to different affiliates, employees have an opportunity to see different 
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operational systems and structures, apply their own specialized knowledge at remote sites, and 
bring refinements back to their home affiliate.  
These two dynamics—formalized meetings from the headquarters and informal 
knowledge-sharing routines between the affiliates—suggest that the literature on subsidiaries and 
multi-national organizations may benefit from a better understanding of how ideas develop 
locally, are channeled upwards by the headquarters, expand and adapt through the network, and 
are refined through the informal connections inherent in the subsidiaries. In addition to identity 
and knowledge sharing, the final major theme to emerge from interviewing the executive 
directors and managers was that of leadership, both from the executive directors themselves and 
from the board of directors. 
Retaining Talent: Organizational Identity and Image 
As previously discussed, the changing external context has required a major shift in how 
food banks operate. These changes required the food banks to shift from their-grass root 
beginnings as organizations run by volunteers and social workers to efficient, accountable 
businesses. To meet the organization’s needs and to fulfill their mission, food banks became 
increasingly professionalized in order to enhance their legitimacy with larger donors and 
improve their organizational reputation (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006) as efficient and 
business-savvy. The food banks studied here have all embraced the concept of 
professionalization as a way to continue to meet their mission. By creating their own national 
organization based out of a major United States metropolis to negotiate with other national 
organizations on their behalf, they have enhanced the legitimacy of all of the food banks in the 
network. Directors have also embraced the concept that previous models (e.g., donated food, 
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extensive volunteer labor) no longer work effectively to meet the mission and have adapted their 
strategies to stay ahead of these changes.  
The executive directors believe in the value of hiring experienced people from industries 
other than social work and paying them a competitive wage. Despite the departure from their 
grass-roots founding, the fact that the mission has not substantially changed makes it easier to 
justify strategic shifts such as these in order to meet their organizational mission. Further, the 
food banks’ organizational identity (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) is malleable enough to not be 
threatened by professionalization; thus, hiring professional managers from the for-profit sector is 
actually seen as consistent with their need to make existing routines more efficient to attract new 
corporate donors while also exploring for innovative new programs to meet a growing demand 
from their base of recipients. Executive directors say that business leaders understand this shift 
towards professionalization because of the same dynamics that they cope with in the for-profit 
sector. Because the executive directors and managers see this trend toward professionalization as 
congruent with their changing identity (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), initiatives for more paid staff, 
routinization of work, and outsourcing relationships with other vendors do not damage their 
organizational identity and they understand that these changes are both necessary and consistent 
with their mission.  
The opposite side of identity is image (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), which represents the 
perceptions of external stakeholders. Although the executive directors see this shift towards 
professionalization as consistent with their identity to provide food to hungry individuals, not all 
of the stakeholders believe that these changes tarnish the food banks’ image. The incongruity 
between the food bank’s intended image (i.e., what the organization wants others to think about 
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it) and the food bank’s reputation (what stakeholders actually think about the organization) may 
lead to conflicts (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006). This sector presents a unique challenge 
for organizations that engage in ambidexterity because stakeholder expectations constrain them 
in two ways. First, the focus on a strong mission reduces the apparent need for exploratory 
activities. Because the goal is feeding hungry people, deviating too far from this mission may 
result in pushback and concern that a particular program is too unrelated to the food bank’s 
goals; thus, focusing on existing programs that are already feeding people is the easiest course of 
action to follow. Second, the nature of charitable work means that external stakeholders assume 
that money spent on non-programmatic expenses is wasteful or inefficient. Directors noted that 
smaller donors and other community members do not understand that the need for well-
compensated leadership or new facilities and underscored the importance of educating external 
stakeholders on the ongoing needs at the food bank. 
 Watchdog organizations such as CN report expenditures such as fundraising costs, staff 
salaries, and utilities as overhead expenses that count against efficiency ratios. What these ratios 
fail to account for are the intangible benefits of long-tenured professional staff such as 
management experience, social networks, and other aspects of human capital. Directors must 
counter these claims with donors who also believe that paying staff is inefficient. In response to 
these attitudes from external stakeholders, executive directors could respond by lowering salaries 
or cutting staff in order to reinvest wages into mission-based programs, but this strategy is 
unlikely to lead to long-term success given the turnover reported by the executive directors.  
In addition to challenges surrounding rising salaries, directors must also convince outside 
stakeholders that the growth initiatives they are pursuing are in the best interest of the 
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organization. The managers understand that the changing operational context requires exploring 
for new investments in space, refrigerated storage, and trucks to continue to meet their mission 
and feed a growing number of hungry people. Communicating this need for growth and 
exploration requires a certain level of issue selling (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 
2001) to convince external stakeholders that these changes are necessary and that money spent 
on things other than direct program costs still contributes to the food bank’s mission. 
Consequently, expenditures for salaries, buildings, and new equipment present a challenge that 
NFP managers must sell to donors and other external stakeholders who may not understand the 
whole picture.  
As the field has become more professional and more efficient in its operations, these 
expectations of market-level salaries for talented employees and modern warehouses have 
collided with stakeholder expectations of how their money is being spent on food bank 
programs. Part of this misalignment may stem from a lack of education between the food banks 
and their donors and other external stakeholders. The executive director of Central related a story 
about a donor who said “Oh I thought that you go out in one little truck and go around.” To 
which she replied, “What? I cover 22,000 square miles with 22 trucks.” The overall dependence 
on external stakeholders for sources of funding and food donations means that managers are 
particularly sensitive to claims of malfeasance. They understand, however, that the competency 
trap (Levitt & March, 1988) may result in decreased performance because of attempting to 
operate at the peak of efficiency. Without growing into larger spaces, the smaller spaces become 
progressively less efficient over time as the mission remains unchanged and the need for 
supplying food continues to grow. Despite the threats that professionalization brought to the 
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image of the food banks, the overall impression is that these steps are necessary to continue 
meeting their stated mission by facilitating exploratory new approaches to ending hunger and the 
ongoing refinements that come from the efforts of professional managers.  
Enabling Leadership: A Complexity Perspective 
 Traditional models of organizations assume that the world is knowable and that effective 
leaders can rely on planning and control to direct organizational actions (Plowman & Duchon, 
2008). Complexity leadership describes modern organizations in terms of adaptation and 
emergence, rather than mechanistic descriptions of bureaucratic organizations (Uhl-Bien & 
Marion, 2009), suggests that leadership emerges as the outcome of interactions among agents, 
and focuses on the ways in which leaders facilitate interactions between organizational members 
(Lichtenstein et al., 2006). Although none of the interviewees expressly referred to it as such, 
this attitude towards leadership is seen at many levels throughout the food banking industry, 
including between the top managers and the staff, the board of directors and the executive 
directors, and even between the Feeding America headquarters and the local affiliates. The 
overarching leadership style seen in the food bank network is to create basic structures such as 
the affiliate network, hire professionals, and then, in the words of the vice president of operations 
at Central, “setting them loose.” This style of leadership allows the professional managers to 
develop creative solutions to novel challenges and to use their ideas and experience to bring in 
more revenue to the food bank or to minimize costs, each of which influences a particular side of 
OA. 
 At the local level, managerial autonomy generated unique programs within the scope of 
the organization’s mission. Although the managers were free to explore for new program 
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options, the interdependent nature of their work necessitates coordination with the other 
organizational members.  
At the national level, Feeding America gave the food banks autonomy to develop and 
implement the programs that would best serve their local communities. In a way, the enabling 
leadership style that developed across the food bank network was driven more by what Feeding 
America did not do, rather than what it did do for the affiliates. Local-level autonomy was 
permitted in many ways, including not mandating that food banks change their name after the 
national network was created, not requiring standardized programs across the network, and not 
directing how donated money would be spent. By playing the role of facilitator (Uhl-Bien, 
Marion, & McKelvey, 2007), Feeding America was able to spread ideas between food banks, 
organize partnerships with food manufacturers and retailers at the national level to influence 
local donations, and channel resources from national fundraising events to local affiliates. After 
making these connections, the local food bank leadership was responsible for implementing and 
adapting the strategies. In this way, the enabling leadership style of the Feeding America 
headquarters allowed affiliated food banks to exploit their network membership to receive 
information, funding, and food donations. This leadership style also allowed affiliated food 
banks to explore for new programs and refinements and new strategies for meeting the need in 
their local community. 
These three main factors—a robust organizational identity that can withstand 
professionalization, strong relationships and different functions for subsidiaries and the Feeding 
America headquarters, and a complexity leadership focus for handling emergent challenges as 
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they arose—all appear to contribute to the food banks’ ability to successfully pursue exploration 
and exploitation.  
Finally, one of the key contributions of this study to the ambidexterity literature is to 
suggest that within the typology of different types of OA (Simsek et al, 2009), these 
organizations are leveraging their new professional identity, their knowledge-sharing routines, 
and their complexity leadership style to engage simultaneously in multiple forms of 
ambidexterity: harmonic, cyclical, partitional, and reciprocal (Simsek et al., 2009). Structure and 
time, two components suggested by Simsek and colleagues (2009), appear to play a key role in 
affiliates’ abilities to explore and exploit. In contrast to some of the received viewpoints in the 
ambidexterity literature, executive directors and senior managers of food banks neither consider 
exploration and exploitation as dichotomous outcomes (March, 1991) nor do they engage only 
one type of ambidexterity or another (Simsek et al., 2009). In contrast, food banks engage in 
multiple types of OA simultaneously. At any particular moment, an affiliate may be engaging in 
cyclical ambidexterity through a capital campaign to raise funds for a new building, while also 
engaging in partitional ambidexterity by outsourcing fundraising to another entity. Refining the 
concept of OA into sub-categorizations is helpful as future research on ambidexterity can begin 
to tease out different processes in play. Qualitative studies such as this one extend our 
understanding of how organizations manage multiple types of ambidextrous operations both 
simultaneously and sequentially. From these findings, the following section describes managerial 






Understanding both the what and the how of OA present opportunities for managers to 
employ some of the findings from this study in their own practice. The results from the 
quantitative portion of this dissertation suggest that particular industry effects may moderate the 
impact of high levels of efficiency; thus, what works well in one industry may not translate to 
another. Benchmarking against close industry competitors (or in the case of NFPs, affiliates) 
when possible, will likely provide a more accurate picture of the relationship between 
exploratory actions, exploitive actions, and financial performance. The qualitative results suggest 
a number of processes associated with ambidextrous operations in the food banking industry that 
may benefit other organizations as well.  
First, this sample of food banks illustrates the importance of managing knowledge at two 
levels. Although the Chicago headquarters acts in a coordinating role, the best ideas may not 
necessarily come from this office. The truly innovative programs may come from subsidiaries 
that need the centralized resources of a headquarters to both refine the program and disseminate 
it across the network. By facilitating connections between the different affiliates and arranging 
an annual conference, the headquarters occupied a central role in the network’s structure, but did 
not use this role to impose their strategic goals on the local affiliates. The local directors also 
understood the value of sending their employees to different locations to see how similar tasks 
were performed differently. Managers may want to consider the role that standard operating 
procedures play in their daily operations, how these standards came to be, and how exposure to 
possible alternates may yield process improvements. 
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Second, each of the managers described the importance of human resources to their 
ability to remain both efficient and innovative. Comments such as, “We capitalized on getting 
smart people that were in for-profit worlds and bringing them over to non-profit and just setting 
them loose,” from the vice president of operations at Central echo Pfeffer’s (2005, 2010) 
sentiments that humans are the final frontier for competitive advantage. Retaining talent became 
a key theme throughout the interviews as the directors described how the food banking industry 
had shifted from one dominated by volunteers and social workers to a fine-tuned business model 
with connections across multiple industries. Although many of the executive directors could 
point to innovative programs or idiosyncratic initiatives that were only in operation at their site, 
none of them believed that the programs themselves were the value in the organization. All of 
the executive directors commented on their staff members’ dedication and creativity in 
developing and implementing ideas to meet the food bank’s ongoing mission. A key take-away 
for managers is that the ongoing training and motivation of employees is just as important in a 
non-competitive setting like NFPs as it is in for-profit organizations.  
Third, an enabling leadership style was seen across the different levels of the 
organization. At the local level, enabling leaders manage the organization’s internal conditions in 
a way that is consistent with the overarching mission (Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007). 
From the food banking context, the directors were receptive to new ideas that enabled the 
organization to more effectively meet its stated mission. Leaders with an enabling style can also 
help shepherd projects from idea to implementation (Howell & Boies, 2004) by championing 
new initiatives to other stakeholders such as boards of directors. At the national level, the 
Feeding America headquarters demonstrated an enabling leadership style through the degree of 
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autonomy given to the local affiliates. Kauffman (1995) has suggested that leaders need to 
forego searching for perfect solutions and instead focus on achieving a series of “workable” 
solutions that will advance the organization’s mission. Managers interested in maximizing the 
value of the professional talent within their organization may want to consider a new style of 
leadership that focuses less on predicting a knowable future and more on enabling others to 
leverage their creativity and skills for the organization’s benefit.  
Study Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Despite the theoretical and managerial contributions from this study, there are a number 
of limitations inherent within the study design that may be overcome by future studies. Despite 
the myriad advantages of large datasets for theory testing, there remain a number of 
disadvantages that must be noted.  
Limitations of Charity Navigator 
First, by limiting the analysis to data collected from IRS-reported financial statements, 
assessing the degree of theoretical correspondence between the extant theory and the measures of 
OA cannot be directly assessed. This dataset was not created to test specific hypotheses and the 
measures calculated by CN are atheoretical in nature. The measures used in the quantitative 
study closely approximate the original concepts of exploration and exploitation popularized by 
March (1991), but the ratio measures themselves lack the ability to calculate reliability statistics 
(Crook et al., 2010). Only future longitudinal studies would be able to determine where each of 
these organizations are in a particular cycle of exploration or exploitation. The present study 
looks at a cross-sectional slice of the CN data to describe the relationship between OC, OE, and 
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FP, but future studies may find it valuable to examine lagged timeframes such as examining 
whether surpluses in earlier years lead to longer periods of positive financial performance. The 
high degree of multicollinearity seen between the independent variables (OC and OE) and FP 
raises questions about how to conduct research in the NFP sector that generalizes beyond 
singular studies when the only extant measures that permit interorganizational comparison are 
financial in nature and drawn from the same IRS filings. Due to the strong positive relationships 
seen between OC and OA as measured in this study, the findings reported to test hypothesis 3 
should be interpreted with caution. Until additional performance measures are introduced that 
permit comparison between NFPs, research methods such as case studies, surveys of 
idiosyncratic measures, and interviews are likely to remain the methods of choice for 
organizational researchers in the NFP sector. The use of IRS Form 990 data as either an 
independent or dependent variable, although convenient and translatable across organizations, 
leaves little room for other financial measures in a research study. Future research in this area 
will hopefully result in other measures that are internally consistent and generalizable.  
Second, the goal of capturing the entire CN dataset is a moving target, as new IRS-990 
filings are reported annually. With a long enough time horizon, longitudinal analysis of this data 
may be able to better detect cycles of exploration and exploitation as well as overall periods of 
growth and decline for charitable giving. Collecting more data will likely improve our 
understanding of concepts such as reciprocal ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009), but researchers 
must be sure that the system to calculate ratings has not changed drastically. One example of this 
caveat is that CN has refined its own rating systems. In 2012, CN began using a new rating 
methodology to translate the ratios from IRS-990 filings into their ratings for exploration and 
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exploitation (charitynavigator.com). Consequently, comparing ratings between different periods 
will be quite difficult. Future research will need to assess the level of agreement between pre-
2012 ratings and post-2012 ratings to determine how to incorporate both of these periods into a 
longitudinal research design.  
In addition to comparisons between these different measurement methods over different 
periods, another way to develop a more complete picture of NFP performance would be through 
triangulation with other NFP rating agencies. Although CN looks exclusively at financial figures 
provided to the IRS, other rating agencies such as GuideStar, the Better Business Bureau, 
LiveWell.org, and GreatNonprofits.org consider perceptual appraisals from various stakeholders 
including volunteers, donors, and industry experts when developing their assessment of NFP 
performance. Attempting to integrate a dataset that incorporates a variety of different measures 
of performance will likely reduce the overall sample size given that organizations with missing 
data on one or more dimension will no longer be included for analysis. Despite this potential 
shortcoming, the ability to correlate different measures of performance may outweigh the 
limitation of a reduced sample size.  
Third, this study looks broadly at the entire NFP sector, as well as narrowly on a sample 
of organizations from one industry within it. The insights gained from the interviews and site 
visits to four food banks may not generalize to other contexts within the NFP sector or back to 
their for-profit counterparts. Because many of the organizations reported in the CN dataset are 
members of a larger organization (e.g., Habitat for Humanity, United Way, Girl Scouts), the 
findings from this study may offer suggestions to these types of organizations that need 
refinement to be meaningful in a more competitive for-profit setting. The inherently non-
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competitive nature of the food banks studied suggests that translating the network learning 
findings to a for-profit context may be difficult. Rather than contact counterparts within the same 
industry, organizations trying to leverage learning relationships may need to look to adjacent 
industries with similar functions but indirect competition.  
Future research in this area may want to consider how NFPs in non-affiliate settings 
attempt to leverage networks to which they do have access. Some questions to consider are how 
NFPs partner with other organizations such as universities to improve their ability to explore new 
options. The concept of partitional ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009) suggests that NFPs may 
be able to engage in ambidextrous operations by partnering with structurally-distinct entities. In 
the present study, food banks are using alliances and outsourcing relationships that are not 
reported in the CN dataset. Research methods such as social network analysis could use data 
from websites such as muckity.com to trace relationships through funding networks, alumni 
networks, or boards of directors. The implication that many of the organizations in this study 
found new ideas from other branches within their network, rather than from a top-down 
hierarchy (Plowman et al., 2007), suggests that this type of structure may need more network-
based methods to gather and analyze data. Despite these limitations, the possibility to understand 
some of these unanswered questions makes this topic one worthy of further investigation.  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
The need to engage in exploration and exploitation activities will continue to present 
challenges to managers who must find ways to refine existing competencies without falling prey 
to the competency trap (Levinthal & March, 1993; Liu, 2006) or engaging so heavily in 
innovation and novel strategies that they actually steer their organization into a failure trap 
(March, 1991; March, 2003). This study begins to look at how the relationship between these 
two types of behaviors is related to financial performance within the unique context of NFPs. 
These organizations do not exist to maximize owner or shareholder value (Sherlock & Gravelle, 
2009), but face even more stringent constraints than their for-profit counterparts due to the 
stakeholder focus on efficiency and the narrow mission focus. The previous ambidexterity 
studies that have looked at single industries have tended to find strong positive support for 
ambidexterity, yet this study was unable to replicate those findings across a broad, multi-industry 
sample of NFPs. These mixed results suggest that measures of ambidexterity may strongly 
influence the relationship between exploitation, exploration, and financial performance. Three 
key factors that facilitated ambidextrous operations emerged from the qualitative analysis of 
interviews with executive directors at a sample of food banks: embracing professionalism, 
knowledge exchange, and leadership.  
These food banks provide examples of organizations that can undergo changes to their 
bureaucratic structure and identity, while continuing to engage in a new and innovative ways of 
meeting their stated mission. Additionally, the food banks leveraged two different network levels 
to minimize the risks associated with innovation by watching others refine new programs first, 
then exploiting second-mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) in order to 
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transplant successful programs to their home territory. Finally, an enabling culture of leadership 
between Feeding America, the boards of directors, and top managers allowed high-performing 
employees to create new ideas and disseminate them across the network. NFPs provide a unique 
context for understanding how organizations engage in OA in resource-constrained environments 
with highly specific missions. Understanding how these collaborative organizations function as 
an interdependent network of ideas and talent may foster the growth of new ideas for improving 
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Figure 1 presents the 2x2 matrix of organizational classifications that result from examining 









Figure 1: Organizational Ambidexterity Classification by Exploration and Exploitation 
 
Quadrant 3:  
Growth Focus through 
New Products / Markets  
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Figure 2 presents Charity Navigator data as website users see it. IRS Form-990 data is parsed 
and displayed for donors, volunteers, and managers. Statistical analysis cannot be performed on 












 Figure 3 presents the Visual Web Ripper interface used for extracting data in order to conduct 

















































Figure 5 presents the IRB approval necessary to engage in human subjects research and conduct 
interviews with participants. 
 






Figure 6 presents the IRB-approved informed consent statement that each interviewee received 
and signed prior to participating in any in this study.  
 






Figure 7 presents the interview protocol used to assess concepts of exploration and exploitation 
with food bank executive directors and other senior staff members.  
 
Figure 7: Interview Protocol
Describe your career path. 
 
How long have you worked for this organization? Did you work at an organization before this 
one? How is this company different? 
 
If you have worked in for-profit before this, what are some differences you’ve seen between 
the two? 
What do you think for-profits can learn from not-for-profits and vice versa? 
 
How would you describe a very successful not-for-profit organization? 
 
Can you tell me about a successful growth initiative that you know of here? 
Can you tell me about a failed growth initiative that you know of here? 
 
Are there any programs that you would like to see added? 
Are there any programs that should probably be eliminated? 
 
Do you see your organization continuing to expand into other areas of the region or country? 
Would you want it to? 
Which places do you think would be likely targets for expansion? 
 
Can you think of any major turning points in the history of this organization? 
 
Are people more interested in trying new things or focusing on things that have been 
successful in the past? 
 
If you had to divide the time you spend on daily tasks into five different buckets, what would 
those look like? 
 
What metrics do you use to define organization performance? Are those benchmarked against 
other organizations? 
 
Are you familiar with any of the rating NFP rating agencies? How do people here feel about 
them? 
 
How does this chapter interact with other chapters within the system? 
 
Are there other major organizations that you partner with? What do they do for your 
organization? 
 





Table 1: Quantitative Impacts of Organizational Ambidexterity on Performance 























Yes Yes + 
Work unit 
effectiveness 
Han et al. 2001 127 
Consumer 
products 
Survey Korea No No + 
Market share and 
ROI 





No No + 
Number of new 
products introduced 
Kyriakopoulos 










2004 325 Biotechnology  Archival Global No No + 
More products on 
the market and in 
development 
He & Wong 2004 206 Manufacturing Survey 
Singapore 
and Penang 
No No + Sales growth 
Auh & Menguc 2005 260 Manufacturing Survey Australia No No + 
Profit, market share, 
and sales growth 
Atuahene-Gima 2005 227 Electronics 
Interviews 
and surveys 
China Yes No + 
Radical innovation 
performance 







No No + 
International 
sustainability 
Lubatkin et al. 2006 139 SMEs Survey 
United 
States 
No Yes + 
Growth and 
profitability 
Jansen et al. 2006 283 
Financial 
services 
Survey Europe No No + 
Average 
profitability 
Bierly and Daly 2007 98 
SME 
manufacturers  








        
Revilla et al. 2011 80 
Product 
development 






2007 269 SMEs Survey Spain No Yes + Customer capital 
Venkatraman et 
al. 
2007 1005 Software 
Longitudinal 
archival 
Global No No + Sales growth 
Lin, Yang, and 
Demirkan 





Yes Yes n.s. 





2009 122 High-tech Survey China No Yes + 
Firm performance 
scale: sales growth, 




2009  141 
Random, multi-
industry 



















No No + Breakthrough drugs 
Sanyal & Sett 2011 108 
Information 
Technology 






2011 142 Pharmaceuticals Survey 
UK, Italy, 
Greece 
No No + Team performance 
Chang, Hughes, 
& Hotho 
2011 265 SMEs Survey Scotland Yes No + Firm performance 





2012 200 Multi-industry Survey Canada No Yes + 
Financial 
performance 





Table 2: Partial Correlation Matrix with Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.             
Fiscal Performance (FP) 1.01 0.39 1           
Exploration 19.67 7.65 0.19*** 1 
Exploitation 33.38 6.00 0.06*** 0.24*** 1 
Ambidexterity 667.81 298.51 0.18*** 0.93*** 0.55*** 1 
Organization Age 53.36 42.55 -0.11*** 0.01 -0.03† -0.01 1 
Organization Size (log) 15.80 1.92 -0.01 0.17*** 0.05*** 0.16*** 0.35*** 1 
 






Table 3: Full Correlation Matrix with Industries 
Variable Name Variable # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Fiscal Performance 1 1.00
Exploration 2 .19* 1.00
Exploitation 3 .05* .25* 1.00
Organizational Ambidexterity 4 .18* .93* .55* 1.00
Organizational Age 5 -.11* .01 -.03 -.01 1.00
Organizational Size (log) 6 -.01 .17* .05* .16* .35* 1.00
   Animal Rights 7 .01 .07* -.02 .05* .09* .00 1.00
   Wildlife Conservation 8 .04* .00 -.01 -.01 -.05* -.01 -.03 1.00
   Zoos and Aquariums 9 .02 .03 .01 .03 .04* .04* -.02 -.01 1.00
   Libraries 10 -.01 -.02 -.05* -.04* .09* .07* -.02 -.01 -.01 1.00
   Museums 11 -.01 -.03* -.08* -.06* .09* .14* -.05* -.03 -.02 -.03 1.00
   Performing Arts 12 -.02 -.08* -.02 -.08* .00 .04* -.05* -.03* -.03 -.03 -.05* 1.00
   Public Broadcasting 13 -.01 -.02 .01 -.02 -.05* -.02 -.03* -.02 -.01 -.01 -.03* -.03* 1.00
   Private Elementary / Secondary 14 -.02 -.03* .02 -.03 -.08* -.03* -.05* -.03 -.02 -.02 -.05* -.05 -.03* 1.00
   Private Liberal Arts Colleges 15 -.02 .02 -.06* -.01 .21* .11* -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.04* 1.00
   Universities / Graduate Schools 16 -.05* .03 .00 .02 .30* .14* -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 1.00
   Other Education Programs 17 -.03* .05* .02 .06* .31* .18* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.03* -.02 -.01 1.00
   Botanical Gardens and Parks 18 .04* .00 -.02 -.01 .00 .01 -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.03* -.02 -.01 -.02 1.00
   Environmental Protection 19 .05* .04* .04* .05* -.09* -.07* -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.05* -.05* -.03* -.04* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* 1.00
   Diseases and Disorders 20 -.03* -.07* -.08* -.09* -.07* -.12* -.05* -.03* -.03* -.03* -.05* -.06* -.03* -.05* -.04* -.03 -.03* -.03* -.05* 1.00
   Medical Research 21 .03* .00 -.02 -.01 -.04* .04* -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.03* 1.00
   Patient and Family Support 22 .01 .05* -.05* .01 -.01* -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 1.00
   Treatment and Prevention Services 23 .01 .02 .02 .02 -.03* .01 -.03* -.02 -.01 -.01 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.03* -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.03* -.01 -.02
   Children and Family 24 .01 .01 .03* .03 -.01 -.02 -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.04* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.03*
   Food Banks, Food Pantries 25 .02 .11* .13* .15* -.09* -.02 -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.04* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.03*
   Homeless Services 26 .03* .06* .00 .05* .01 -.05* -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.04* -.03* -.02 -.03 -.03 -.04* -.05* -.02 -.03*
   Multipurpose Human Services 27 -.02 -.03* -.06* -.05* .08* .02 -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.04* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.03
   Social Services 28 -.01 -.01 .04* .01 -.01 -.01 -.05* -.03* -.03* -.03* -.05* -.06* -.03* -.05* -.04* -.03 -.03* -.03* -.05* -.06* -.03* -.04*
   Youth Development 29 -.04* -.03* -.01 -.03* .01 -.01 -.05* -.03 -.02 -.02 -.05* -.05* -.03* -.05* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.05* -.02 -.03*
   Development and Relief 30 .02 .02 .10* .06* -.09* -.07* -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.05* -.03 -.04* -.03* -.02 -.03* -.03 -.04* -.05* -.02 -.03*
   Humanitarian Relief 31 .00 .04* .10* .07* -.06* -.03* -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02
   International Peace, Security 32 .01 .01 .00 .02 -.04* -.04* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.02
   Single Country Support 33 -.01 .02 .04* .04* -.06* -.05* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.03* -.03 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.02
   Advocacy and Civil Rights 34 -.01 -.01 -.06* -.03* -.08* -.06* -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.04* -.03* -.02 -.03* -.03 -.04* -.05* -.02 -.03*
   Community and Housing 35 -.01 .05* .08* .07* -.01 .18* -.03 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.03 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.01 -.02
   Community Foundations 36 .02 .05* .05* .06* -.08* -.02 -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.02
   Fundraising Organizations 37 -.03* -.07* -.02 -.07* .00 .03* -.06* -.03* -.03* -.03* -.06* -.06* -.03* -.06* -.05* -.03* -.04* -.04* -.06* -.07* -.03* -.04*
   Research and Public Policy 38 .01 .02 .01 .01 -.03 -.02 -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.04* -.02 -.02
   Religious Activities 39 .01 -.06* .01 -.05* -.05* -.09* -.04* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04* -.05* -.03 -.04* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.05* -.02 -.03*





















Note: * p < .05; n = 5,450

























25 -.02 -.03* 1.00
26 -.02 -.03* -.03* 1.00
27 -.02 -.03* -.03* -.03* 1.00
28 -.03* -.04* -.04* -.05* -.04* 1.00
29 -.03* -.04* -.04* -.04* -.04* -.05* 1.00
30 -.03 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.03* -.05* -.04* 1.00
31 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.02 1.00
32 -.02 -.03* -.03* -.03* -.03 -.04* -.03* -.03* -.02 1.00
33 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.03* -.02 -.04* -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 1.00
34 -.02 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.03* -.05* -.04* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* 1.00
35 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 1.00
36 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.03* -.03 -.04* -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.02 1.00
37 -.03* -.05* -.05* -.05* -.04* -.07* -.06* -.05* -.03* -.04* -.04* -.05* -.03* -.04* 1.00
38 -.02 -.03* -.03 -.03* -.03 -.04* -.03* -.03* -.02 -.02 -.02 -.03* -.02 -.02 -.04* 1.00
39 -.03 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.03* -.05* -.04* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.04* -.02 -.03* -.05* -.03* 1.00




 Table 4: Description of Charity Navigator Sectors and Industries 
Sector Name 
 Industry Name 
Count % of Dataset 
Animals 386 0.07 
 Animal Rights 
 Wildlife Conservation 










 Performing Arts 












 Private Elementary / Secondary 
 Private Liberal Arts Colleges 
 Universities / Graduate Schools 












 Botanical Gardens and Parks 








 Diseases and Disorders 
 Medical Research 
 Patient and Family Support 












 Children and Family 
 Food Banks, Food Pantries 
 Homeless Services 
 Multipurpose Human Services 
 Social Services 
















 Development and Relief 
 Humanitarian Relief 
 International Peace, Security 












 Advocacy and Civil Rights 
 Community and Housing 
 Community Foundations 
 Fundraising Organizations 













Religion 332 0.06 
 Religious Activities 





Totals 5450 1.00 




Table 5: Pairwise ANOVA Comparison for Average Fiscal Performance Differences 
between Charity Navigator Quadrants 
 
n Mean FP Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2 Quadrant 3 
Quadrant 1  1242 0.90 (.08) - - - 
Quadrant 2  1052 0.95 (.01) .04* - - 
Quadrant 3  1170 1.05 (.02) .15* .11* - 
Quadrant 4  1975 1.08 (.09) .18* .13* 0.02 
 





Table 6: Clustered Regression Analysis of Complete Charity Navigator Dataset with Fiscal 
Performance as the Dependent Variable 
 
Variable β Robust S.E. t-Value 
Intercept 84.68 * 8.10 10.45 
Exploration 1.34 * .59 2.26 
Exploitation .27 .25 1.07 
Ambidexterity -.01 .02 -0.67 
Organizational Age -.11 *** .02 -6.40 
Organizational Size (Log) -.38 .45 -0.84 
    
Adjusted R2 0.04 ***   
Model F 38.23   
 
Note: *** p < .001; * p < .05 


















Exploration 8.01* (3.75) -10.91* (3.94) 7.34** (2.67) -1.19 (.93) 5.11* (2.18) 2.63† (1.43) 
Exploitation 4.66† (2.65) -5.67* (2.78) 4.24** (1.56) -1.02* (.55) 2.12 (1.32) -0.09 (.82) 
Ambidexterity -0.2† (.11) 0.42** (.13) -0.21* (.08) 0.03 (.02) -0.13* (.06) -0.05 (.04) 
Organizational Age -0.15† (.08) -0.06 (.06) -0.07 (.05) 0.04 (.11) -0.37** (.13) -0.03 (.08) 
Organizational Size  
 (log net assets) -2.91 (2.19) 1.31 (1.83) -0.89 (.91) 0.85† (.49) 1.74 (1.45) -3.64* (1.43) 
Constant -24.48 (92.27) 213.23* (95.36) -27.87 (50.32)  129.09** (20) 7.21 (50.41) 143.23** (35.26) 
 
 n = 189 n = 139 n = 90 n = 108 n = 147 n = 207 
 
F = 3.55** 
Adj. R2 = .06 
F = 8.88*** 
Adj. R2 = .22 
F = 2.39* 
Adj. R2 = .07 
F = 1.42 
Adj. R2 = .02 
F = 3.99** 
Adj. R2 = .09 
F = 3.61** 
Adj. R2 = .06 
 
 
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 













“Grand Rapids, Michigan started the mobile pantries. 
They put food that was going to be thrown away on a 
pantry that rolled. They took an old Coke truck or Pepsi 
truck, put food on it and they invented the mobile 
pantry. So you know, you go there to see how they 
started it, but now we all do mobile pantries because 
they did it so well. You know, that just goes on 
network wide.”  
(Executive director, Orange) 
Our network has "Food Bank of the Year" awards 
and recognitions. Now we're recognized for our 
backpack program because we are the third largest 
backpack program in the country. Chicago just 
contacted us, "Will you mentor a new food bank 
employee that's running their backpack program?" 




[I took a trip to two other food banks in the network] 
one much bigger than us and one much smaller so a lot 
to gain from both. It was pretty cool and you say "Man 
I can't believe we weren't doing that." And you see 
things that we were doing better than them. But they 
both do some really, really cool things that I want to 
get introduced here as soon as we're ready. It gets you 
out of the box very quickly which is necessary. 
(Volunteer coordinator, Orange) 
I just don’t remember calling up another plant 
manager at another automotive industry to say, 
“Hey, can I come over and look at your facility?” 
The benchmarking wasn’t as easy in those industries 
because everybody’s very competitive whereas I 
think we all tend to now share more freely in this 
organization and in this type of industry.  











Table 8. Continued. 




You can’t operate with all volunteers. Not like this. 
You have to have the best that you can afford and that’s 
always been rough on us. You pay as much as you can, 
and you get the best that you can get for that. And if 
you are competitive it comes back to you with good 
staff. You don’t want to train people and have them 
jumping ship to go someplace where they can make a 
lot more money. So you either provide benefits, make 
the pay equitable or other intrinsic things that people 
appreciate. We can’t have people working here who are 
below the poverty level themselves. That’s a goal that 
we need to adhere to. 
(Executive director, Riverside) 
I'm sure there's still some non-profits that feel like 
they need to pay their director twenty grand and 
their other people ten thousand dollars, but I don't 
think there are many that are successful because 
you've got to have the commitment and the positive 
energy and wanting to come to work and wanting to 
do what we're supposed to do.  




We have used outside consultants in personnel until we 
grew to be larger and now we have hired that person 
who was on contract and they are now full time staff in 
foods. So I think that if you just look and see what's 
new and who can do it better and maybe at a much 
more reasonable cost. I don't think that we always have 
to have everything in-house. But I think you just have 
to be business savvy.  
(Executive director, Central) 
We now hire a direct mail company in Boston that 
does our direct mail. Back when I started we were 
writing our own letters. We all started with maybe 
four people and $300,000 budgets and handwriting 
your letters to people. It costs us a ton. It’s totally 
efficient and they’re very astute in how they write it. 
They know how to get that dollar. So it costs us 
$500,000 and we make a million. So it’s a no 
brainer.  













Four or five years ago, we did not have Wal-Mart and 
Sam’s Club donating to us at all because liability 
issues, but now they do donate to us. A partnership was 
formed at the national level. We couldn’t get the local 
donations from some of the larger companies until that 
partnership was formed at the national level. (Vice 
President of community relations, Wright) 
We are very blessed to have a national organization 
that gives us best practices that really guides us in 
the strategic planning process. We have a contract 
with them so we have some guidance and some road 
map to not stay where we are, but to go to the next 
level from where we were in 1986 to maybe 1992, 
we were in that grass roots organization stage and 
then get to a larger organization.  
(Executive director, Wright) 
Encouraging 
Experimentation 
[The executive director] is probably one of the greatest 
visionaries I've ever seen … she has an idea and she 
wants you to get it done and she surrounds herself with 
the people who get things done. Part of her great skill, 
is having a vision and bringing it to fruition. She 
surrounds herself with creative and innovative people 
and then lets them do their thing. But there is always 
parameters and as long you operate within the 
parameters, she allows you to make mistakes. 
(Executive chef, Central) 
Well, we started with the [garden] downtown, which 
was a grant for a community garden, and we got 
property from the Housing Authority. So we put that 
one in and people could just come and have a plot 
maybe the size of this room and they could grow 
whatever they wanted and they could keep whatever 
they grew. The Housing Authority Director said, 
“That’s terrible land. You’ll never grow anything 
because it’s fill.” And it’s beautiful. So he was 
wrong. We are growing for our own use and not for 




Table 9: Managing Knowledge Quotes 




Grand Rapids, Michigan started the mobile pantries. They put food that was going to be thrown away on 
a pantry that rolled. They took an old Coke truck or Pepsi truck, put food on it and they invented the 
mobile pantry. So you know, you go there to see how they started it, but now we all do mobile pantries 








You know you go to conferences, they highlight something and you think, “Well that might work for us” 








Our network has "Food Bank of the Year" awards and recognitions. Now we're recognized for our 
backpack program because we are the third largest backpack program in the country. Chicago just 








We are very blessed to have a national organization that gives us best practices that really guides us in 
the strategic planning process. We have a contract with them so we have some guidance and some road 
map to not stay where we are, but to go to the next level from where we were in 1986 to maybe 1992, we 








And we just sent our volunteer coordinator who’s new to [another territory] because it’s such a bigger 
facility and a lot more volunteers come through there and we are trying to grow our volunteer program 
because we have a bigger building now so we can accommodate them. And then we sent him to [a 
different territory] to watch their volunteer program because they’re about our same size. But you’ll see 
something they do well that you weren’t doing well. And you’ll see something they’re not doing as well 
as you. It’s just really good to send your people to other affiliates. They just get a bigger picture of what 








I have never seen them as cooperative and as supportive of one another as they are here. We really aren't 
that competitive in that. We are always competing for money but we are not like, "That's mine and you 








When I first came here we didn’t really have a lot of programs. We’re primarily a food bank where we 
secure the food, store it and give it out to charities. We weren’t doing any direct service much where we 
would actually give it to individuals and one of our first big programs of that type was our Food for Kids 









I just don’t remember calling up another plant manager at another automotive industry to say, “Hey, can 
I come over and look at your facility?” The benchmarking wasn’t as easy in those industries because 
everybody’s very competitive whereas I think we all tend to now share more freely in this organization 









Table 10: Retaining Talent Quotes 




So back then if you did a survey of who ran nonprofits and how long they ran them, they were all women 
and they were all social workers. If I was graduating from college today, I wouldn’t get a degree in social 
work. I would get a degree in business or marketing. Then I would probably get my Masters or get a 








We capitalized on getting smart people that were in for-profit worlds and bringing them over to non-profit 
and just setting them loose and saying, “If you’ve got an idea and it is going to be able to bring revenue 








I think any nonprofit today, if you wanted to survive you must be adaptable and you must be flexible and 
your employees have to be adaptable and flexible and I tell people that come to work here, "If you don’t 
like change, you don’t need to work here. If you don’t like being on a fast-pace and some days feel like 
you are like that little mouse running on that wheel, you don’t need to work here," cause in any one 








I'm sure there's still some non-profits that feel like they need to pay their director twenty grand and their 
other people ten thousand dollars, but I don't think there are many that are successful because you've got 
to have the commitment and the positive energy and wanting to come to work and wanting to do what 








I guess it would be comparable to starting a little business. We were managing it [a new program] with 
volunteers to begin with, but then we needed to bring on a staff person. We were just selecting product 
out of the warehouse that would work with the program, which is healthy snacks and things children can 
prepare on their own. But then as it grew, we had to start fine-tuning our planning to make it more 
standard. We had to start ordering the food. We had to start associating a specific cost per child and we 








We have used outside consultants in personnel until we grew to be larger and now we have hired that 
person who was on contract and they are now full time staff in foods. So I think that if you just look and 
see what's new and who can do it better and maybe at a much more reasonable cost. I don't think that we 








We now hire a direct mail company in Boston that does our direct mail. Back when I started we were 
writing our own letters. We all started with maybe four people and $300,000 budgets and handwriting 
your letters to people. It costs us a ton. It’s totally efficient and they’re very astute in how they write it. 








We use outside fundraisers, direct mail, which have been very beneficial. If we didn't do that we would 








Table 11: Enabling Leadership Quotes 
Sub-Process Exemplary Quote Influencing Source 
Facilitating 
Connections 
They've got Kraft's president on their board and ConAgra's president on their board. They're way up 
here. American Airline's president is on their board. They're in Chicago and it's a national organization 







On a national level, what they do is they solicit all the large food companies and get mega truck loads 
of products that we could never access and get. In addition to that, they advocate on a national level in 
Washington, D.C. for federal nutrition programs or other programs affect local food banks to ensure 
that we are going to have access to those kinds of items. We can’t do that at a local level. It would take 







Food banking has become a pretty fine-tuned business operation. Four or five years ago, we did not 
have Wal-Mart and Sam's Club donating to us because of liability issues, but now they do donate to us. 
A partnership was formed at the national level. We couldn't get the local donations from some of the 







In order to say we are an affiliate of Feeding America we must maintain those standards and they come 
and inspect us every two years and write a report and say, "Yep, you’re above standard, or you are 







They don’t tell us what to do and how to do it, but they monitor our storage practices. We have a 
contract. And as long as we are within that contract, you know, we are good. They will come every 
other year and visit us and see how we keep our warehouse and all our inventories. If it’s in line, if we 







Surrounding yourself with the people who have the strengths you don’t. And it doesn’t matter what 







[The executive director] is probably one of the greatest visionaries I've ever seen … she has an idea 
and she wants you to get it done and she surrounds herself with the people who get things done. Part of 
her great skill, is having a vision and bringing it to fruition. She surrounds herself with creative and 
innovative people and then lets them do their thing. But there is always parameters and as long you 







Non-profits have had to say "Look, our top line is shrinking. We're going to have to become more 
efficient to be able to provide the same number of pounds, same meals, and the same number of people 






My board is here to set policy and procedure and help lend that total strategic vision and support that 
and make sure that they are being good stewards of the money that we receive and make sure that we 
are spending it wisely and properly. That's their role. Their role is not to hire or fire or tell me what to 
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